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I. INTRODUCTION

Just days before 17-year old Salifou Yankene arrived at the Kennedy
International Airport requesting asylum, he was armed with an automatic
weapon as a child soldier in Ivory Coast.' In his home country, Yankene
faced the threat of death if he did not comply with his leader's commands
to raid communities and shoot at civilians. Fearing his return to the Ivory
Coast, he sought refuge and asylum protection in the United States.
Yankene never thought he would end up a child soldier. His father's
position as a civil servant in the defense ministry provided Yankene with
a life in the upper-middle class and access to French schools. Yankene's
childhood ended abruptly when his father and older sister were shot to
death when he was twelve. His father's death forced Yankene and his
family to flee and seek harbor in a camp for displaced persons. Their
safety was not secure as troops from the rebel faction, Mouvement
Patriotique, targeted children like Yankene and his younger brother,
Abdul, to join the faction. Despite their mother's pleas, the rebel troops
chopped off Abdul's hand in front of his family and forcibly recruited
Yankene to join their ranks.

1. Nina Berstein, Taking the War Out of a Child Soldier, N.Y. TIMES/REGION, May 13,
2007, at 29.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss2/4

2

ASYLUMFOR
CHILD SOLDIERS
Everett: The Battle Continues:
Fighting
for a More Child-Sensitive Approac

It was then that Yankene began his life as an "unwilling child soldier
trained armed, drugged and growing numb to violence." 2 Under the
threat of death, Yankene looted during raids, grabbed child conscripts and
severely beat civilians.' He was forced to shoot at people, although he does
not know if he killed anyone. Risking his own life and the lives of his
family, Yankene escaped from the Mouvement Patriotique. With the help
of a family friend, Yankene was given a passport and instructions to fly to
the United States. When he arrived in the United States, he stated to
authorities in broken English, "I want to make refugee."
However, his struggles were not yet over as he sought to obtain
refugee status in the United States. Originally placed in a juvenile shelter,
Yankene was abruptly moved to a county jail after an immigration service
dentist determined that Yankene was over 18 years old. He heard voices,
suffered from emotional swings, and was ultimately diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder. When he confided to a counselor that he had
once attempted suicide, he was immediately transferred to a mental
institution, only to be so medicated "that he could hardly move."4 At his
hearing before an immigration judge, Yankene requested asylum.
However, the government argued that he was barred from asylum based
on his experience as a child soldier and a persecutor of others. Luckily for
Yankene, who would have been returned to Ivory Coast and forced into
conscription or killed, the judge granted his request for asylum. Yankene
still risks being deported, however, if the government pursues its right to
appeal.
Unfortunately, Yankene's experience as a child soldier is not unique.
Today, approximately 20 million children represent more than half of the
world's refugee and internally displaced population.4 Of these children,
approximately 300,000 have been conscripted to serve as soldiers
worldwide.5 From young boys carrying guns at the frontlines of battle, to
girls sexually abused and forced to serve as wives to armed combatants,
child soldiers are brutalized, beaten, killed, and often forced to inflict the
same injury or death upon their family and friends. Like their adult
counterparts, children try to avoid such recruitment and treatment, leaving
...

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Through a Child's Eyes: Protecting the Most
Vulnerable Asylum Seekers, 75 No. 21 Interpreter Releases 757, 758 (1998) [hereinafter Bhabha
& Young, Through a Child's Eyes]; see also U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR),
Children: The World of Children at a Glance, http://www.unhcr.org/children/ glance.html. (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Children: The World of Childrenat a Glance].
5. Wendy Perlmutter, An Application ofRefugee Law to ChildSoldiers, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y
REv. 137, 137 (2001); see also Children: The World of Children at a Glance, supra note 4.
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their country and fleeing abroad.6 While some may travel with relatives or
other adults, many child soldiers are forced to seek refuge alone. Only a
lucky few make it to U.S. shores.
In the past year, the United States apprehended approximately 5,000
unaccompanied children entering the country.7 While statistics are
unavailable, some of these children likely have been involved in armed
conflict, and have served as child soldiers. In light of the atrocities child
soldiers have suffered, one would assume that they would easily be able
to obtain asylum within the United States. However, unlike Yankene, not
every former child soldier seeking asylum is granted protection Rather,
because the United States assesses child asylum claims using the same
legal standard as adults, many remain ineligible for asylum based on the
acts they committed while conscripted.9
Yankene's story raises significant questions about how, and to what
extent, the United States should address the claims of former child soldiers
seeking asylum. That is, should child soldiers be treated like their adult
counterparts and thus barred from asylum because of the atrocities they
committed while in armed conflict? Or, should their status as children and
victims of the very acts that they committed be taken into account? What
responsibility, if any, does the United States have toward protecting former
child soldiers within its borders and providing for their rehabilitation into
American society?
This Article argues that both international and domestic law obligates
the United States to address the special needs of child soldiers seeking
asylum. Although the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (formally
Immigration and Naturalization Services) established Guidelines for
Children's Asylum Claims in 1998, this Article argues that these policies
failed to incorporate sufficient procedural protections or any substantive
changes to the asylum determination system itself. Without necessary
procedural and substantive changes to asylum law, the United States will
do little to ensure that those most in need of refugee protection receive it.
Ultimately, what is needed is an asylum system focused and centered on
the best interest of the child principle as described in the 1989 Convention
6. MATTHEW HAPPOLD, CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 160 (Manchester

University Press 2005) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW].
7. Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interest of the Child
Principle to Protect UnaccompaniedMinors, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 131, 133 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Casualtiesof Way: ChildSoldiersandtheLaw Before the Subcomm. on Human
Rights and the Law, 109th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hearings].Anwen Hughes, senior counsel of
Human Rights First Refugee Protection Program, recounts the stories a number of former child
soldiers facing the threat of deportation and ineligibility for asylum.
9. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 133.
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on the Rights of the Child for both procedural and substantive asylum
determinations.
A number of scholars have addressed the prevailing problem facing
child soldiers and other unaccompanied children in applying for asylum.
Jacqueline Bhabha and Wendy Young, for example, discuss the practical
implications of the 1998 U.S. Guidelines by applying them to the asylum
claims of unaccompanied children in general.'" They suggest that the
Guidelines should provide more procedural protection to unaccompanied
children to ensure their well-being in applying for asylum." David
Thronson goes one step further by endorsing the best interest of the child
principle as stated in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) for all immigration determinations for unaccompanied children. 2
Other scholars have focused on child soldiers specifically, addressing the
risks that child soldiers face in being barred from asylum through Article
1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention). Specifically, Matthew Happold and Michael Gallagher take
a more international approach, discussing a number of multilateral
instruments related to child asylees as well as how various countries have
applied Article 1F to child soldiers. 3
Unlike other articles, this Article examines the experiences of child
soldiers to demonstrate that U.S. asylum law still fails to provide sufficient
procedural and substantive protection to unaccompanied children, even
after the promulgation of the 1998 U.S. Guidelines. For example, without
procedural safeguards such as having access to an attorney or waiving the
one year application deadline, child soldiers are disadvantaged in obtaining
access to asylum at all. Even with broader access, child soldiers still
remain subject to exclusion from asylum in the United States because of
their persecution of others or their involvement with, or material support
of, terrorist organizations.
Thus, this Article argues that both procedural and substantive changes
to U.S. refugee law are necessary to ensure the well-being of child
soldiers. This embraces David Thronson's contention that the most
10. Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: UnaccompaniedChild
Asylum Seekers and the New US. Guidelines, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84 (1999) [hereinafter
Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature].
11. Id.
12. David B. Thronson, Kids Will be Kids? ReconsideringConceptionsofChildren'sRights
Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 988 (2002).
13. Matthew Happold, Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status: Child Soldiers andArticle
IF of the Refugee Convention, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1131 (2002) [hereinafter Excluding
Childrenfrom Refugee Status]; Michael S. Gallagher, SoldierBoyBad: ChildSoldiers,Cultureand
Bars to Asylum, 13 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 310 (2001).
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fundamental change needed in U.S. refugee law is the implementation of
the best interest of the child principle as described in the CRC. 14 This
Article attempts to further underscore the importance of incorporating that
standard, especially for child soldiers who have such a high risk of being
barred from asylum. Only by incorporating the best interest standard will
the 1998 Guidelines be able to better approach claims from child soldiers
and recognize these young asylum seekers as children first.
Part H of this Article provides a general overview of the current
situation of child soldiers around the world today and the international
response to their circumstances. Part III discusses the difficulties that child
soldiers face as unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. Specifically, this
part examines the Refugee Convention, as well as the CRC as the basis by
which nations assess child-asylum claims. By looking at the procedural
protections afforded to unaccompanied children in other countries, this
part suggests ways in which the United States should expand its procedural
protections to children in the 1998 Guidelines for Child Asylum Claims.
Part IV applies current U.S. asylum law to child soldiers, suggesting why
child soldiers may be subject to exclusion from asylum under the
Immigration and Nationality Act for the persecution of others or for the
material support of terrorist organizations. Finally, Part V suggests
substantive changes to U.S. asylum law based on the best interest of the
child principle as stated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
II. THE CURRENT CRISIS OF CHILD SOLDIERS
A. Forcedand Mistreated:General Overview of ChildSoldiers
"When I went there, they have started first to train us ... to help in the
garage as car mechanic, sometimes to wash the car,...wash guns."' 5 As
this statement by a former child soldier suggests, child soldiers' actions
extend well beyond the stereotypical perception of a young boy "toting an
' While no precise definition exists, international
AK-47."16
organizations
have defined child soldiers in broad terms. The Coalition to Stop the Use
of Child Soldiers, for example, defines child soldiers as

14. Thronson, supranote 12, at 1004.
15. MIcHAELA LUTWIG, FORMER CHILD SOLDIERS AS REFUGEES IN GERMANY, 13 (Rebecca

Kmentt, ed., Quaker U.N. Office 2003), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/
TdHQUNO.pdf. (quoting Antonio, a former child soldier from Angola).
16. CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 1.
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Any child, boy or girl less than 18 years of age, who is
recruited compulsorily, by force or otherwise with the
intention of using him or her for combat by armed forces,
paramilitary forces, civil defense units or other armed
groups. Child soldiers are used as combatants, forced
spouses, messengers, porters or cooks, or sexual
services..."
Using this definition, statistics suggest that there are approximately
300,000 children serving as child soldiers worldwide.' The problem has
been most critical in Africa, where up to 100,000 children as young as nine
are estimated to have been involved in armed conflict in 2004 alone. 9
However, children are also used as soldiers in parts of Asia, Latin
America, Europe and the Middle East.2' The Coalition to Stop the Use of
Child Soldiers estimates that most child soldiers are between the ages of
14 and 18.21
Child soldiers, thus, vary in age, in how they are recruited, and in the
treatment they face after they are conscripted.22 Further, young boys are
not the only ones to serve in government or rebel armed forces. Like their
male counterparts, girls are used as front-line combatants, spies, porters,
or sexual slaves. 23 Female soldiers in particular, are forced to entertain
17. See Philippine Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Armed or Not, They are
Children: A Primeron the Use of ChildSoldiers in the Philippines, http://www.childprotection.
org.ph/monthlyfeatures/sep2k4b.pdf. Child soldiers have alternatively been defined by the Cape
Town Principles as
[any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks,
porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as
family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and force
marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has
carried arms.
See ACTIONS FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, CRITICAL IssuEs: CHILD SOLDIERS 2 (2002),
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3f83de714.pdf [hereinafter ACTIONS FOR THE
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN].

18. Perlmutter, supranote 5.
19. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, http://www.child-soldiers.org/
childsoldiers/some-facts (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., ACTIONS FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 17, at 6.
23. Id. This is not the case for all girl soldiers. In Sri Lanka and the Philippines, for example,
girl soldiers are separated from their male counterparts and sexual relations are forbidden without
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troops and serve as "wives" to adult combatants. If they refuse any sexual
advances, they risk being beaten or killed.24 Whether boy or girl, a
majority of child soldiers come from impoverished backgrounds, many of
whom have been separated from their families.25
As the definition describes, child soldiers have many roles. They may
start working as servants, and then take on additional responsibility such
as guard duty, patrolling, or carrying heavy loads.26 Many serve as spies,
lay down landmines, or are thrown to the front-lines of battle.27 Child
soldiers may be recruited differently by government or rebel factions, but
they are nevertheless targeted for "having special qualities that set them
apart from adults. 28 Children, for example, are easily manipulated and
considered more fearless because they are less able to assess the risk of
combat and lack "the strong-streak of self-preservation that adults have. 29
Child soldiers can handle light weaponry, have fewer demands than adults,
and thus more easily serve at the bottom of military hierarchy."3
Their youth, maturity, and vulnerability make children the primary
targets of military and rebel groups. In Uganda, for example, children were
the targets ofrecruitment for the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).3" At their
initiation into the LRA, children were beaten and smeared with shea nut
oil in order to harden them to life as soldiers and allow the LRA to easily
find them if they ran away.32 Children abducted by the LRA were forced
to participate in the beating and killing of other children - some even
forced to engage in cannibalistic practices. Told they would be killed or
severely beaten if they tried to escape, Ugandan child soldiers were made
to carry out raids, loot and burn houses, and kill civilians.33

the consent of the girl and the approval of the commander. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers, ChildSoldiers GlobalReport2004,9 (2004) [hereinafter GlobalReport2004], available
at http://www.child-soldiers.org/library/global-reports?root id= 159&directory id= 165.
24. ACTION FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 17, at 7; see also FAITH J.H.
MCDONNEL & GRACE AKALLO, GIRL SOLDIER: A STORY OF HOPE FOR NORTHERN UGANDA'S
CHILDREN (Chosen 2007).
25. See The Secretary-General, Promotion andProtection on the Rights of Children: The
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, 10, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/51/306 (Aug. 1996) (prepared by Gra~a Machel) [hereinafter Machel Report], available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/51/plenary/a51-306.htm.
26. Id. 11.
27. Id. 7-10.
28. Id. 7.
29. CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 10.
30. LUTWIG, supra note 15, at 8.
31. Global Report 2004, supra note 23, at 105.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Not all children are forcibly recruited. Rather, some "voluntarily"
enlist. However, research suggests that it is misleading to consider
enlistment as a child soldier as "voluntary" since few children see
alternatives to involvement in armed conflict.34 The U.N. Study on the
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, otherwise known as the Machel
Report, suggests that as economic and social conditions worsen, and as
educational opportunities become more limited, the number of children
involved in armed conflict increases.35 That is, when armies exhaust the
number of adult soldiers, children have little choice but to join in
government or rebel armed forces. Other children, faced with violence all
around, may decide that it is better to be armed. Like their adult
counterparts, they may seek vengeance against the atrocities committed
against their families by either government or armed rebel forces.36
Whatever the stated reason for children's "voluntary" recruitment into
armed services, research suggests that, unlike adults, children are limited
in their ability to make informed or free choices regarding their
involvement in warfare.37 Due to children's vulnerability and limited
intellectual and emotional maturity, recruiters are often able to capitalize
on children's need for employment and survival or their desires to redress
injustices or seek revenge.3" Children find it more difficult to resist peer
pressure and membership in armed military factions.39 With war and
danger all around, joining military groups provide children with shelter,
food, and protection. In such circumstances, many scholars seriously doubt
that a child's involvement in military groups is actually voluntary.4"
No matter how children are recruited, exposure to extreme atrocities
has a more lasting and impressionable effect on child soldiers compared
to adults.4 As the repeated witnesses, victims, or perpetrators of atrocious
acts such as killing, raping, torture and the destruction of property, child
soldiers become inured to killing.42 Having lost family members and
friends, their only relationships with others is limited to their interactions

34. Machel Report, supra note 25, 38.
35. Id. 40.
36. Id. 41.
37. See, e.g., Julie Guyot, Suffer the Children: The PsychosocialRehabilitationof Child
Soldiers as a Function of Peace-Building, 3 (2007), http://www.child-soldiers.org/psychosocial/LinkedGuyot_2007.pdf. (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also Machel Report, supra note 25, 1$ 39-41.
40. Guyot, supra note 37; see also Machel Report, supra note 25, $ 38.
41. Id. see also Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 104.
42. ACTIONS FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 17, at 17.
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with other child soldiers and military leaders.4 3 The longer children are
involved in armed conflict, the more they begin to identify with military
leaders as their "new family" or protectors." The child soldiers begin to
depend on these adults as they would parents or other adult relatives.4 5
Even after conflict ends, the suffering of child soldiers persists. The
psychological consequences that child soldiers suffer as a result of their
experience in armed conflict is lasting and tremendous. Most child soldiers
suffer from extreme emotional difficulties. Some display aggression or
hyperactivity and others withdraw socially and suffer from extreme
sadness and preoccupation with guilt.' The extreme emotional intensity
of their experience has resulted in some child soldiers displaying
"emotional flatness" or lack of reaction in dealing with the brutal acts they
have committed or witnessed.47 Many face unwanted and intrusive
flashbacks, sleep disorder, anxiety, and rage.48 The extent of the trauma
faced depends on the experience, personality structure, and maturity of the
child. Further, child soldiers are often diagnosed with post traumatic stress
disorder, requiring substantial assistance to both cope with their past
actions and reintegrate into their communities.4
Girls in particular face unfortunate consequences as a result of their
participation in armed conflict. Many communities perceive girls who
have been forced to have sexual relations with soldiers as defiled, and
reluctantly - if at all - welcome young women back from armed conflict.5"
For some women who were forced to carry the children of their male
military leaders, their status as single mothers is considered extremely
taboo, causing the young mothers and their children to be shunned from

43. Machel Report, supra note 25, 41; see also Stuart Lusting et al., Review of Child and
Adolescent Refugee Mental Health, 43 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, 6
(2004).
44. Machel Report, supranote 25, 41.
45. Id.
46. Fred Granfeld, Child Soldiers, p. 276 from Jan C.M. Williams, Developmental and
Automony Rights of Children: Empowering Children, Caregivers and Communities (2002),
availableat http://www.Endchildsoldering.org/documents/grunfeldarticle.pdf.
47. Dr. Elisabeth Jareg, Crossing Bridges and NegotiatingRivers: The Rehabilitationand
Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces, 3 (2005), http://www.childsoldiers.org/psycho-social/CrossingBridges-and-NegotiatingRivers---Rehabilitation
_and_Reintegration of ChildrenAssociatedwithArmed_Forces,_2005,_by_Dr_
ElizabethJareg_-_Save theChildren.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
48. Id.
49. Lusting et al., supra note 43, at 1, 4.
50. Susan McKay et. al., GirlsFormallyAssociatedwith FightingForcesandtheirChildren:
Returned and Neglected, 2 (2006) (noting that young mothers described being treated as second
class citizens by their communities upon their return).
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their communities." Moreover, despite their increased involvement in
armed conflict, many girls have been excluded from disarmament
programs that are designed to assist child soldiers in reintegrating back
into society because the nature of their participation does not fit the "child
soldier" stereotype. 2
While the emotional and psychological consequences that child
soldiers suffer are undoubtedly severe, some scholars point to children's
resilience and ability to regain a sense of "normalcy" after undergoing
such traumatic experiences. 3 Children that have taken part of
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, for example,
have been able to return to their communities as capable, competent
individuals. 4 Those children who have been able to take an active role in
planning and implementing their own rehabilitative and reintegration
processes have been able to neutralize feelings of distrust and
estrangement often experienced by former child soldiers. 5 The most
positive results come from those who have integrated back into school. 6
While participating in armed conflict, former child soldiers undoubtedly
trail behind in school as compared to their peers. Nevertheless, special
programs designed to educate former child soldiers indicate that schooling
has played a vital role in helping them overcome the extreme emotional
trauma they faced. 7
The fact that children demonstrate some resiliency and ability to
"bounce back" should not undermine the seriousness and severity of their
experiences in armed conflict. Even in light of their resiliency, former
child soldiers may suffer from flashback episodes, recounting their
experiences in armed conflict.5" These episodes may cause some children
51. See e.g. id. at 2; Victor E.M. Gbegba & Hassan Korama, The PsychologicalImpact of
Civil War in SierraLeone, 12 (describing the exclusion experience of one teenage mother in Sierra
Leone from community being so strong that she stopped feeding her child, causing critical
malnourishment).
52. See, e.g., International Relations and Security Network, Special Report, Child Soldiers:
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, available at www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/content/
download/8069/8035 1/file/03%20DDR.pdf.
53. See, e.g., Guyot, supra note 37, at 3 (noting that some children suffer post-traumatic
stress disorder).
54. Id. at 11.
55. Jareg, supranote 47, at 5.
56. Dr. Lucia Castelli et al, PsychosocialSupportfor War Affected Children in Northern
Uganda 5 (2005) http://www.child-soldiers.org/psycho-social/PsychosocialSupport-forWar_
AffectedChildren in NorthernUganda_-_Lessons_Learned,_2005,_by DrLucia_
Castelli,_Elena_Locatelli andMarkCanavera.pdf. (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
57. Id.
58. Guyot, supranote 37, at 3-5; see also Ilene Cohn & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers:
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to reencounter feelings of extreme guilt or sadness, among other emotional
reactions. 9 For many children, war brought the death of family members
and friends, and they may have witnessed or inflicted harm onto others.
Such experiences are long-lasting and likely to shape the lives of former
child soldiers permanently. 6°
B. InternationalResponse to ChildSoldiers
The problem of children serving in armed conflict has not gone
unnoticed. In fact, the increase in the number of child soldiers has led to
a significant amount of international legal efforts to regulate the use of
child soldiers at the both the state and local level. 6' A number of
international instruments, for example, mandate that states refrain from
recruiting and using children under the age of 15 in armed conflict. 62 Other
international treaties have gone further by restricting the use of children
under the age 18 in both international and internal warfare.63

The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 106-10 (Clarendon Press 2004).
59. Id.
60. One study suggests that the psychological consequences of severe traumata caused by
human rights violations are life-long. See LUTWIG, supranote 15, at 7.
61. See CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that "[t]his
growth in international concern has resulted in significant legal developments, including the
conclusion of new treaties on the subject.").
62. The 1949 Geneva Convention was considered the first of its kind to provide general
protection to children as civilians in occupied and unoccupied territories by setting the minimum
age for recruitment at 15. Alison Dundes Renteln, The ChildSoldier: The ChallengeofEnforcing
InternationalStandards,21 Whittier L. Rev. 191 (1999); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art 3, Aug. 12, 1949, U.S.T. 3316, U.N.T.S. 135.
Since then, a number of international instruments have built upon the Geneva Convention
mandating that children under the age of 15 not take a direct part in either international or internal
armed conflict. See Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, Dec. 7, 1978,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most universally
accepted treaty regulating the recruitment and use of child soldiers. See. U.N. Convention of the
Rights of the Child, Art. 38 U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989). Article 38 of the CRC
specifically addresses children in armed conflict and requires that all State parties "undertake to
respect and ensure the respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child." Id. at 38. Like the two 1977 Protocols, the CRC
mandates that State parties refrain from the recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 in
armed conflict. Id.
63. With the minimum age limit of 15 being the most controversial provision, the United
States and other States instead ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. G.A. Res. 54/263, Art. 4 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001). The Optional
Protocol requires that all States take feasible measures to ensure that their armed forced do not have
children under the age of 18 taking part in direct hostilities. See TINY VANDEWIELE, OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL: THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT, A COMMENTARY ON THE
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In an effort to prohibit the use of child soldiers, the international
community has recognized that those children under the minimum age
limit are themselves victims of human rights violations.' These children
have undoubtedly participated in the commission of brutal acts.65 They
have shot, beaten, and killed other innocent civilians, some of whom were
their own family or neighbors.' International organizations and
governments alike acknowledge that many child soldiers do not do so on
their own volition; rather, these children are physically abused or given
drugs, deliberately brutalized in order "to harden and numb them into
' The extent to which these children
becoming more ruthless soldiers."67
have suffered has led the international community to recognize them as
victims of the very atrocities they were forced
to commit. Now, child
68
recruitment is a crime under international law.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, xv (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 2006);
Optional Protocol, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 Art.4 (May 2000). Similarly, the Optional Protocol
minimum age limit applies to government forces, armed groups and rebel forces alike. See CHILD
SOLDIERS ININTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 68.
64. See, e.g., The Redress Trust, Victims, PerpetratorsorHeroes?: ChildSoldiersBefore the
International Criminal Court, 29 (2006) [hereinafter Redress Trust],
http://www.redress.org/publications/childsoldiers.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); see also CHILD
SOLDIERS ININTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 2 (stating that "an unusual feature of how child
soldiers are viewed is that they are often seen as both victims of human rights abuses and as human
rights violators.").; Hearings, supra note 8, at 2 (describing child soldiers as being victimized);
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/questionsand-answers (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (stating that the Coalition primarily views child soldiers
as victims of armed conflict); Bhabha & Young, Through a Child's Eyes, supra note 4, at 757
(1998) (noting that children themselves are increasingly the targets for human rights abuses).
65. UNICEF, Childrenat Both Ends of the Gun, www.unicef.org/graca/kidssoldi.org (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009).
66. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Revolutionary United Front forced captured children
to take part in the torture and execution of their own relatives, after which they were led to
neighboring villages to repeat the slaughter. Id.
67. Perlmutter, supra note 5, at 137; Machel Report, supra note 25, 30.
68. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, for example, for which more than
90 States are parties, was established as a permanent court in 1998 to "try persons enlisting persons
under the age of 15." See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art.
8(2)(e)(vii), UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998). Moreover, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
established by the Rome Statute in 2004 issued a landmark decision holding that individuals may
be held criminal responsible for recruiting children in armed conflict. This was the first
international criminal body to indict a person for the recruitment and employ children in war; see
alsoNoah B. Novogrodsky, LitigatingChildRecruitmentBefore the SpecialCourt ofSierraLeone,
7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 421 (2006).
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Il. BEYOND BORDERS: THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSES TO CHILD SOLDIERS SEEKING ASYLUM

The problem of child soldiers does not take place in a vacuum.
Children also flee their countries and travel abroad to avoid the harsh
treatment they face as soldiers. Like their adult counterparts, children are
eligible for the same protection under international and U.S. refugee law.69
However, as drafted, neither international nor U.S. refugee laws
specifically address how child soldiers should be protected when they seek
asylum abroad.7" As a result, when child soldiers seek asylum in the
United States in particular, they must comply with the same substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary requirements as adults.7 Like adults, child
soldiers also may be denied asylum for the persecution of others, and
subsequently returned to the harsh conditions from whence they came.
These same children internationally protected from harm within their own
countries find themselves excluded when they seek refuge abroad.
In recent years, international treaties designed to protect child soldiers
from human rights abuses have also influenced international refugee law
and forced nations like the United States to take a closer look at how it
treats child-asylum seekers.7 2 As the first international treaty to afford
special protections for children's rights, the 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child ("CRC") has been considered to have been the most
influential treaty affecting refugee law.73 Among other things, the CRC
calls for the protection of refugee children, including child soldiers, whose
rights have been violated.74 In particular, it calls for states to make "the
best interest of the child" its primary consideration in all actions
concerning children, including those for asylum.7 5 As one of the most
ratified treaties worldwide, a number of countries have established
guidelines to assess child asylum claims based on the CRC and its "best

69. Bhabha & Young, Through a Child's Eyes, supranote 4, at 758; Bhabha & Young, Not
Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 87.
70. Indeed, there is no "treatise or body of law that [directly discusses] how nations should
respond to the brutal acts by child soldiers when these children seek refuge status." Perlmutter,
supra note 5, at 137.
71. Thronson, supra note 12, at 1000 (noting that "[w]hen children find themselves in
immigration proceedings unaccompanied by adults, the same substantive rules, evidentiary
requirements and procedural complexities that apply to adults also apply to them.").
72. Id.
73. U.N. Convention of the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989)
[hereinafter CRC].
74. Id.
75. Id.
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interest of the child" principle.76 In 1998, the United States also created its
own Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims ("1998 Guidelines" or
"Guidelines") using the CRC's best interest principle as a tool for
establishing procedural protections for children.17 Ten years after their
implementation, however, the U.S. Guidelines still fall significantly short
of providing children with procedural safeguards they need when applying
for asylum. Further, by largely ignoring the best interest of the child
principle in the substantive analysis of U.S. child-asylum claims, child
soldiers still risk being excluded and denied the protection they deserve.
This section will first address the international and U.S. statutory
requirements for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Second, this section will
provide an overview of the CRC's best interest of the child principle and
describe how it has been incorporated into asylum law in both the United
States and abroad. By comparing various international guidelines for child
asylum claims, this section will finally suggest additional procedural
protections that the United States should incorporate into its own
Guidelines.
A. Eligibilityfor Asylum UnderInternationaland U.S. Law
The 1951 Refugee Convention is considered the premier international
instrument establishing requirements for refugees seeking safe harbor
abroad.78 Designed to provide for the basic rights of refugees and establish
minimum standards of refugee treatment, the Convention is considered
"the most comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees yet
attempted on the international level. 79 Over 144 nations have become
parties to this treaty.80
Unfortunately, the 1951 Refugee Convention was geographically and
temporally limited to European persons who became refugees as a result
76. See, e.g., Immigration and Refugee Board, Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and
Evidentiary Issues (1996), availableat http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca./en/about/guidelines/child_e_htm;
see also U.K. Immigrant and Nationality Directorate, Unaccompanied Children § 352 (1990),
availableathttp ://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/laws-policy/immigration-rules/part1 l.html.
77. U.S. Guidelines for Child Asylum Claims, 8 Immig. L. Serv. 2d PSD Selected DHS Doc.
325, 2 (1998).
78. Perlmutter, supra note 5, at 138.
79. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res 2198 (XXI), at 5,
(Sept. 1, 2007), availableat http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf.
80. State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol (Nov. 1, 2007) [hereinafter UNHCR Refugee Guidelines], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73bOd63.pdf.
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of events occurring before January 1, 1951.81 Thus, the 1967 Refugee
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugee was subsequently adopted to
eliminate the limitations of the 1951 Refugee Convention.82 As the
Protocol incorporated all ofthe substantive provisions of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, including its definition of "refugee," by accession to the
Protocol, states are in effect parties to the 1951 Convention.83 The United
States, in particular, is not an official party to the 1951 Convention.
However, by ratifying the 1967 Protocol and essentially incorporating its
provisions into U.S. refugee law, the United States has become "de facto"
party to the Convention. The Convention's definition of "refugee,"
therefore, guides states like the United States in their domestic refugee and
asylum laws.
Under the Convention, the term "refugee" applies to a person if,
owing to well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
a person is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of his or her
country's protection and is unable or unwilling to return to it. 84 The U.S.
statutory construction of "refugee" is slightly broader in scope. It extends
refugee status not only to those who have suffered past persecution, but
also to those who can prove they have a well-founded fear of future
persecution.85 Thus, in order to be eligible for asylum in the United States,
one must show that he or she has either been persecuted in the past or have
a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of one of the
enumerated grounds of race, religion, political opinion, nationality or
membership in a particular social group.
The 1951 Convention however, does not specifically address how
children should be protected when they seek asylum.86 Moreover, in
81. Id.; see also Won Kidane, The TerrorismException to Asylum: Managingthe Uncertainty
in Status Determination,41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669, 679 n.57 (2008).
82. See Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 79, at 5; see
also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
83. See Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 79, at 6.
84. See GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8 (2d ed. 1996).
85. As stated in the INA § 101(a)(42), a refugee is a "person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality .... and who is unable or unwilling.., to avail himself or herself of the
protection of,that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8
U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A); INA, § 101(a)(42)(A).
86. Bhabha & Young, Through the Eyes of a Child, supra note 4, at 758; U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection
and Care, 4 (1994) [hereinafter Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care],
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=3ae6b3470 (last visited Feb. 21,
2009); Machel Report, supranote 25, 85 (noting that the 1951 Convention may not cover those
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interpreting its own regulations, the United States makes no exception for
children as to the applicability ofthe asylum standard.87 For some children,
this equal standard may not pose a problem. In fact, a large number of
children seek asylum as derivatives of their parents.88 For example, when
a parent applies for asylum, the child's own claim is encompassed in the
parent's application. Thus, the child receives asylum when it is granted to
the parent.89 Unaccompanied children, on the other hand, are
disadvantaged "because they have no parent from which to gain legal
status."9 This is particularly true for children like child soldiers who have
lost their families and arrive in the United States alone. With no parent to
whom to latch their claim, child soldiers are treated like adult applicants
and are required to comply with the same requirements for asylum as their
adult counterparts.9 This equal treatment of children and adults is unusual
in U.S. law, as children in other contexts such as family, contract, and
juvenile criminal law are held to different legal standards.92
Treating unaccompanied children like adults presents substantial
problems. First, children seeking asylum alone are often unfamiliar with
the complexities of asylum law. While asylum-seeking children may be
legally represented in immigration court, representation is a privilege, not
an entitlement.93 As a result, nearly half of detained children lack legal
representation.94 Asylum is already a complex and confusing proceeding,
fleeing armed conflict and that since the cold war, many Governments have been reluctant to
provide asylum and have even sought to prevent asylum seekers from reaching its borders).
87. See, e.g., Cruz-Diaz v. INS, 86 F.3d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[i]n the
absence of statutory intent [to] apply a different standard to juvenile[s] ... we are not at liberty to
substitute a different interpretation."); Garcia-Garcia v. INS, 1999 WL 150822, at 2 (4th Cir. 1999)
(noting that "this [asylum] standard applies to juveniles ....
88. Thronson, supra note 12, at 996.
89. Thronson states that while, accompanied children have tended to be subsumed within
their family's asylum application, even these children risk being denied asylum if their parents are
denied. Id.He suggests that "[slubsuming children into their parents' claim too often means that
children are ignored." Id.
90. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 138.
91. Thronson, supra note 12, at 1000.
92. See, e.g., Kristine Nogosek, It Takes a Worldto Raise a Child:A Legal andPublic Policy
Analysis ofAmericanAsylum Legal StandardsandtheirImpacton UnaccompaniedMinorAsylees,
24 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing American contract, tort and criminal law and concluding
that children are held to "a legal standards that takes into consideration their cognitive, emotional
and physical development."); see also, Bhabha & Young, Through a Child's Eyes, supranote 4,
at 757-58.
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(4)(A) (2000).
94. Id; see also Cara Anna, Nobody? Just You? Few Lawyers Aiding Children Facing
Deportation,Associated Press, Dec. 2,2006, availableathttp://www.refugees.org/uploadedFiles/
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even for adults.95 For a child soldier forced to stand before an immigration
judge and alone recount the atrocities that he or she underwent, seeking
asylum can be an especially daunting experience. Children, moreover, due
to their age and maturity level, often lack the ability to articulate the harm
they suffered in a meaningful way. Child soldiers may be especially less
willing to discuss - and in effect relive - their trauma. As a result, by
dealing with children in the same fashion as adults, child soldiers who
would be eligible for asylum may nevertheless be denied due to their
inability to articulate and therefore meet statutory requirements for
asylum.
Treating children as adults when they seek asylum also undermines
the internationally accepted belief that children are vulnerable and deserve
special attention and care.96 As articulated by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees' (UNCHR) Policy on Refugee Children,
children are physically and psychologically less able than adults to provide
for their own needs and protect themselves.97 Children thus depend on
adults to provide not only for physical survival but also psychological and
social well-being.98 Moreover, unlike adults, children are still developing
physically, emotionally and psychologically.99 Interruptions in their
development more seriously affect children's ability to cope with
traumatic and damaging experiences.100
Children's vulnerability and special needs have given rise to number
of international instruments seeking to protect refugee children as separate
from adults. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), for
example, not only recognizes that the right to apply for asylum is
fundamental to every person, but further acknowledges that children are
"entitled to special care and assistance."'0 1 UNCHR has also issued a
Investigate/Newsroom/HeadlinesNobody.Just.You. AP. 12.pdf; Ofella Casillas & Vanessa BauzA,
ImmigrantKids - Alone and Detained,CHI. TRIB., June 9, 2008.
95. Thronson, supra note 12, at 1001-02.
96. See, e.g., GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE

CHILD, 13 (1995) (noting that states which are parties to international instruments such as the
Declaration on the Rights of the Child and then later the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
recognized that children, because of their vulnerability and immaturity, require a "higher standard
").
of protection in some areas of their lives ....
97. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Ex. Comm. of the High Comm' r Programme,
Sub-Comm. of the Whole on Int'l Prot., Policyfor Refugee Children, 11, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/82
(Aug. 3, 1993).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. 15.
101. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
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number of conclusions and guidelines calling attention to the special needs
of refugee children, and emphasizing that their needs can differ
substantially from those of adults. °2 Overall, in light of their age,
dependency and vulnerability, children are unique under international
jurisprudence. By uniformly treating children as adults in asylum, U.S. and
international refugee law has lagged far behind in offering children "the
protection and assistance they deserve."'0 3
B. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child-Providing
Protectionfor ChildAsylum Seekers
In light of the increasing attention refugee children have received from
the international community, countries like the United States have made
efforts to more closely align their asylum laws with international human
rights instruments. As Bhabha and Young suggest, international
instruments have become increasingly important for states in interpreting
their obligations toward those seeking asylum."M One treaty that has
arguably been the most influential on asylum law is the 1989 Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC).105
Ratified by nearly every nation, the CRC takes a unique multidisciplinary approach to protecting the rights of children as individuals."0
Among other things, the CRC recognizes children as "the direct holders of
rights" with a distinct legal personality from that of adults. 0 7 By
incorporating a vast range of human rights - economic, political,
educational, and social - the CRC casts children as individual rights
holders, even in instances where
"the child may lack the capacity to
08
exercise rights autonomously."'
While the CRC is by no means a refugee or asylum treaty, it is
nevertheless important in the child asylum context because its provisions
102. See, e.g., Conclusions Adopted by the Ex. Comm. on the Int'l Prot. of Refugees, (Cons.
Nos. 47, 59), 1975-2004; 1998 U.S. Guidelines for Child Asylum Claims, 8 Immig. L. Serv. 2d
PSD Selected DHS Doc. 325, 2 (1998). As later explained in Part IIl.B, the United States looked
to UNCHR Policies and Guidelines to promulgate its own 1998 Guidelines for Child Asylum
Claims.
103. Bhabha & Young, Through a Child's Eyes, supra note 4, at 758.
104. Id. at 759; see also Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 93.
105. U.N. Convention of the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989)
[hereinafter CRC].
106. Machel Report, supra note 25, 10.
107. Machel Report, supra note 25, at 64 (noting that "the Convention establish a legal
framework that greatly extends the previous recognition of children as the direct holder of rights
and acknowledges their distinct legal personality.").
108. Thronson, supra note 12, at 989.
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apply to all children.' 0 9 Among other things, its provisions set forth
guiding principles for states to follow in assessing child asylum claims. As
stated in Article 22 of the CRC, states are required "take appropriate
measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status .... whether
unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents .

. .

. receive

assistance."'10

appropriate protection and humanitarian
Thus, all states
must afford each child within their jurisdiction all rights as stated in the
CRC without regard to citizenship or immigration status. All children who
are capable of forming their own views also have the right to express those
views freely in all matters affecting them."'
The CRC further obligates state governments to take measures to
12
ensure that a child seeking asylum receives appropriate protection.'
These measures include making the best interest of the child the primary
consideration in all actions concerning children "whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies.""' 3 The CRC reasoned that this standard
was important because the interests of children can at times conflict with
their adult counterparts. Thus, states must carefully separate out the
various interests at stake." 4 While states do not always have to take the
course of action best for children, they must make the best interest of the
child a "primary consideration.""' 5 Therefore, the best interest of the child
is not only relevant to procedural issues but also substantive questions
"pertinent to child asylum claims." '16

The CRC does not articulate what constitutes the best interests of the
child. Rather, given that the interests of children are not always identical,
the CRC urges states to analyze how each course of action may affect
children on a case-by-case basis."' UNCHR has suggested factors that
states should take into consideration when assessing the asylum claim of
an unaccompanied minor." 8 These factors include the age of the child, the

109. Refugee Children: Guidelineson Protectionand Care, supra note 86, at 5 (noting that
"refugee children are covered because all CRC rights are to be granted to all persons under 18 years
of age without discrimination of any kind."); see also CRC, supra note 105,
110. G.A. Res. 44/25, 22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
111. Id. 3, 12.
112. Id. 2.2.
113.

(2007).
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

1, 2.

MICHAEL FREEMAN, Commentary, ARTICLE 3: THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 24

Refugee Children: Guidelineson Protectionand Care, supra note 86, at 21.
Id. at 22.
Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 147; see also FREEMAN, supra note 113, at 44-50.
Refugee Children: Guidelineson Protection and Care,supra note 86, at 6.
Id.
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child's own desires about his or her own future, and whether extended
family or other caretakers reside in the country of refuge, among other
considerations." 9 Ultimately, the goal of the best interest of the child
in an
principle is to allow the child to grow up "in a family
' 20 environment,
understanding.'
and
love
happiness,
atmosphere of
This is not to suggest that using the CRC's best interest of the child
principle will always result in a simple, easy answer when adjudicating
child asylum claims. As the UNHCR's Guidelines on Protection and Care
note, assessing a child's best interest can be difficult and no single answer
may be indisputably correct.' 2' A course of action that an adult sees as in
a child's best interests, for example, may run counter to a child's expressed
views and preferences. Although its results may be uncertain, the best
interest of the child principle still plays an important role in many states'
adjudication of children's asylum claims. 122 The CRC's recognition that
children are the holders of rights and that their best interests should at least
be given primary consideration reminds states to recognize that child
asylum seekers are children first and asylum seekers second.
A number of countries have taken steps to ensure that their asylum
laws more closely align with the CRC's best interest of the child principle.
For example, in 1996, both Canada and the U.K. assigned either a panel
board or representative to assist unaccompanied children in the asylum
process.123 The panel or representative assures that the child is appointed
legal counsel and that the child is informed of the various stages and
proceedings of his or her claim. 24 Canada's Immigration and Refugee
Board in particular, requires that the claims of unaccompanied children are
identified as soon as possible and that their claims are given scheduling
and processing priority. 25 The Board also "attempt[s] to ease the burden
on unaccompanied children by establishing a special procedure for their

119. Id.
120. See CRC, supra note 105, pmbl.
121. Refugee Children: Guidelineson Protectionand Care,supra note 86, at 22.
122. Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 96 (noting that the best
interest principle "is important in foregrounding the child as an agent and bearer of rights" as
compared to asylum law's mechanisms for establishing a child's views, which is largely
underdeveloped).
123. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 151-52
124. Id.
125. See Immigration and Refugee Board, Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and
Evidentiary Issues: Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 63(5) of the
Immigration Act, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/guidelines/childe.htm#AI (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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claims, and an evidentiary126standard sensitive to each child's level of
maturity and development.
Using the CRC's best interest of the child standard as the guiding
principle, the UNCHR also promulgated guidelines in 1997 proposing that
refugee status determinations should be made quickly and with appropriate
procedures catering to the special needs of children. 127 The UNHCR
suggests that states appoint each child a legal representative, guardian
and/or advisor with expertise in child welfare.12 The UNHCR Guidelines
extend further than the Canadian Guidelines and discuss circumstances
that may qualify as persecution for children but not for adults such as
being subjected to forced labor, among other things. 129 Overall, these
Guidelines have at least begun to consider that children, like child soldiers,
may experience persecution differently from adults, and thus more childsensitive procedures are warranted.
C. U.S. Guidelinesfor ChildAsylum Claims: The Needfor
More Protection
With an increasing number of unaccompanied child asylum seekers
entering the United States each year, the United States has also responded
to international and domestic pressure to expand the protections afforded
to children. 3 ° In 1998, the INS (now the Department of Homeland
Security, DHS) promulgated the Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims
(Guidelines) to acknowledge the "unique vulnerability and circumstances
of children."'' The 1998 Guidelines were designed, in general, to provide
guidance to asylum officers adjudicating children's asylum claims.' 32 To
address what procedures should take place within immigration court, the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge issued a memorandum in 2004
establishing guidelines for immigration court cases involving

126. Bien, Nothing to Declarebut their Childhood: Reforming U.S. Asylum Law to Protect
the Rights of Children, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 797, 814 (2004).
127. Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protectionand Care,supranote 86, at 100.
128. Id.; see also Bien, supra note 126, at 812-13.
129. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 150 (providing further detail of the protection to children
provided by the UNHCR Guidelines).
130. Bien, supranote 126, at 816.
131. U.S. Guidelines for Child Asylum Claims, 8 Immig. L. Serv. 2d PSD Selected DHS Doc.
325, 2 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Guidelines].
132. Id.
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unaccompanied children.' 33 These Interim Procedures in, a large part,
mirror the 1998 Guidelines.
Like Canada and other countries, the U.S. Guidelines also look to the
CRC's best interest of the child standard as a "useful measure" to
determine child asylum claims."' However, despite U.S. acknowledgment
of the helpfulness that international instruments like the CRC can provide
to asylum law, the United States remains one of only two countries yet to
ratify the CRC.' 35 One reason for the delay is that the United States
undergoes an extensive examination and scrutiny of treaties before
ratifying them.136 This ratification process can take several years or longer,
especially if the treaty is considered controversial, as the CRC is in the
United States. The CRC has received opposition for a number of reasons.
Some opponents have argued that the treaty impedes on the parent-child
relationship by giving the government too much responsibility for
dictating how to raise children.'37 Others argue that refugee admission is
finite and that there is a need to ensure that the intake of immigrants
remains at "politically tolerable levels."' 38 Due to such opposition,
the
139
ratification of the CRC has not taken a priority in the U.S. Senate.
Failure to ratify the CRC has meant that the best interest of the child
principle has played a less important role in the U.S. assessment of child
asylum claims than it has in other states. While the United States looks at
the best interest principle as a useful tool in the 1998 Guidelines, this
principle has only been used to define procedural measures to adjudicate
child asylum claims. 4 ° However, it has not altered substantive
requirements for asylum. Many have suggested that the Guidelines

133. See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice, Interim Operating Policies and Procedures
Memorandum 04-07: Guidelinesfor Immigration Court Cases Involving UnaccompaniedAlien
Children (2004), available at www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppmO6/06-03 .pdf [hereinafter Interim
Procedures].
134. Id.at 3.
135. UNHCR, Convention on the Rights of the Child: Ratification Status, (2004)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/11 .htm(last visited Feb.21, 2009) [hereinafter
Convention on the Rights of the Child: RatificationStatus].
136. See U.N. Children's Fund, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter
Frequently Asked Questions].
137. Dalrymple supra note 7, at 148-49; Nogosek, supra note 92, at 19.
138. Dalrymple supra note 7,at 153.
139. See also FrequentlyAskedQuestions, supranote 13 6 (suggesting that another reason why
the United States has not ratified the CRC is that the United States typically only ratifies one treaty
at a time. Currently, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women is considered the nation's priority for ratification.).
140. 1998 Guidelines, supra note 131, at 2.
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demonstrate the U.S. willingness to tackle the serious asylum issues that
children face."'4 However, in comparison with the protections
4 2 afforded by
other nations, these measures are still extremely limited. 1
One of the protections that the 1998 Guidelines provide to childasylum seekers is allowing a trusted adult to attend the asylum
interview.' 43 Whether a family member or other support person, the
Guidelines suggest that the presence of a trusted adult is in the best interest
of the child and helps to "bridge the gap between the child's culture and
the.., asylum interview."'" The Guidelines acknowledge that sitting and
interviewing before an unfamiliar asylum officer can be an especially
intimidating experience for a child. The trusted adult thus serves as a
"source of comfort" as the child recounts the experiences he or she faced,
for example, as a child soldier.'45
Moreover, the 1998 Guidelines suggest that it is in the best interest of
the child to have an interview with an official who has specialized training
in child refugee issues.'46 Children should be made to feel more
comfortable in front of an asylum officer by having the officer build
rapport through an opening statement, or by allowing the child to bring a
toy, or to testify near an adult or friend instead of on the witness stand.'47
Both the 1998 Guidelines and 2004 Interim Procedures encourage the
asylum officers and judges not to assume that inconsistencies from a
child's statement are proof of dishonesty. 4 8 Indeed, both guidelines
"recognize that a child's testimony may be limited not only by her or his
ability to understand what happened, but also by his or her [own] skill in
describing the events in a way that is intelligible to adults.' 49 Thus,
asylum officers and immigration judges must take into account the child's
age, maturity, psychological makeup, and ability to recall events. 5°

141. See, e.g., Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supranote 10, at 124 (noting that
"the United States should be congratulated for its prompt release of Guidelines for Children's
Asylum Claims"); Dalrymple, supranote 7, at 155 (noting that the Guidelines incorporate special
procedural protections for children to create a "child-friendly asylum interview environment.");
Bien, supra note 126, at 819 (stating that "U.S. refugee policy is moving toward a greater
awareness of the particular procedural obstacles children face in the asylum system.").
142. Id.
143. 1998 Guidelines, supranote 131, at 5.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 6; Interim Procedures, supra note 133, at 5.
148. 1998 Guidelines, supranote 131, at 14-15; Interim Procedures, supra note 133, at 7.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Although the Guidelines and Interim Procedures represent a
significant step in the U.S. acknowledgment of the special needs of
unaccompanied children, both fall short of providing all of the necessary
procedural protection that children need to successfully assert their asylum
claims. Incorporating many of the procedural mechanisms used in the
Canadian, U.K. and UNHCR Guidelines would put the United States one
step further toward providing the necessary protection to unaccompanied
children.
Of primary importance to improving the Guidelines is the
appointment of a guardian ad litem in each case to assist in assessing the
best interest of the child. Although the 1998 Guidelines suggest the use of
a trusted adult, it does not require a designated representative or panel of
advisors like its Canadian and U.K counterparts. 5 ' While a trusted adult
is beneficial, he or she may still lack the experience and expertise in child
welfare or may lack adequate knowledge of the asylum procedure. Like
the British or Canadian Guidelines, the U.S. Guidelines can assure through
the use of a guardian that children receive "fair and equal access to the
services to which they are entitled" such as support and counseling,
assistance with health care, housing, and other social needs.152
The assistance of a guardian ad litem, however, should in no way
substitute for legal representation for the child asylum seeker.153 As
mentioned previously, less than one-half of children in DHS custody have
access to an attorney. However, children and adult asylum seekers alike
are three to five times more likely to win their cases if they are
represented. 54 While statutory language states that aliens may not receive
counsel if it will burden the government with expenses, Bhabha and
Young suggest that this does not necessarily preclude government support
for representation for those who cannot afford it.'55 They argue that the
statutory language simply means that such funding is not required.'56 In the
case of children seeking asylum alone, legal representation is critical.
157
Without it, "the protection offered by the U.S. Guidelines may be lost."'

151. Bien, supra note 126, at 821.
152. Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 117.
153. Id. at 116.
154. Id. at 118 (describing the lack of legal counsel available for asylum seekers as a troubling
situation especially because "applicants represented by counsel are three times more likely to be
successful in their asylum claims"); Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 157 (noting that "asylum seekers
are about five times more likely to win their cases if they have representation.").
155. See Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 119.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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Furthermore, essential to ensuring that sufficient procedural
protections are available to children requires the United States to expedite
procedures for child-asylum detainees. Although the Interim Procedures
suggest a new tracking system to distinguish unaccompanied and
accompanied child asylum claims, there is no indication that either type of
case will be given priority when scheduled for a hearing.' Prolonged
detention, especially for child soldiers who have already suffered severe
atrocities, can seriously affect their well-being.' 59 However, immigration
courts should also exercise caution so that procedures are not accelerated
have legal representation and the
at the expense of ensuring that children
60
opportunity to develop their cases.
The fact that unaccompanied children are also kept in detention for the
duration of the asylum proceedings further underscores the importance of
making child-asylum claims a high priority for immigration court.
Although the Supreme Court in Reno v. Flores16' required that childasylum seekers be held in the "'least restrictive setting possible' that is
appropriate for their age and special needs,"' 62 the desertion of children in
detention centers continues to frequently take place.' 6 3 A number of
facilities have admitted to housing immigrant children alongside juvenile
offenders and using solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure. 6 As
the 1998 Guidelines emphasize the importance of addressing the
158. Interim Procedures, supranote 133, at 7.
159. See generally Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Protectingthe
Rights of Children: The Need for U.S. Children's Asylum Guidelines, 12 (Dec. 1998)
http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/ins child.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (describing a
child-asylum case where a Guatemalan boy suffered from nightmares and would wake up crying
in the detention center as he to stand before an immigration judge and be granted asylum.)
[hereinafter Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children].
160. See, e.g., Carolyn J. Seugling, Towarda Comprehensive Response to the Transnational
Migration of UnaccompaniedMinors in the UnitedStates, 37 Vand. J.Trasnat'l L. 861, 880-81
(describing one immigration judge as stating, "All the INS people in Washington care about are the
numbers, [and thus attorneys and judges are] under a lot of pressure just to move things along faster
...[which is] a problem for kids who can't get counsel."); see also Women's Commission for
Refugee Women and Children, supra note 159, at 12-13 (noting that children like child soldiers
who have suffered from severe trauma and shock also need time to process what has happened to
them before going forward with their asylum proceedings).
161. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
162. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 159.
163. Id. at 158-59; see also Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children, Prison
Guardor Parent?:INS Treatmentof UnaccompaniedRefugee Children,7 (May 2002) (noting that
"[d]espite the trauma child newcomers have frequently already experienced in their homelands and
during flight, the United States often subjects them to detention in highly inappropriate
conditions.").
164. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 159.
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vulnerability and circumstances of children, such poor treatment of
detained children turns the Guideline's goals ofprotecting children's needs
on its head.'65
Moreover, like their adult counterparts, child-asylum seekers must
apply for asylum within one year of entry into the United States, except
when the circumstances affecting applicant's eligibility for asylum have
changed, or in extraordinary circumstances.' 66 The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) addressed this issue as it applies to children in Matter of YC-, holding that that detention for unaccompanied children during the oneyear period following arrival constituted an extraordinary circumstance for
purposes of applying for asylum.' 67 However, this holding only partially
addresses the one-year limit as applied to children. A better solution would
be to universally exempt children from the one-year limit, as they "lack the
maturity to understand the intricacies of U.S. asylum law and frequently
do not have access to legal counsel.""16
As a final procedural protection for children, guaranteed judicial
compliance or training on the 1998 Guidelines is essential. Even if a child
receives an interview with an asylum officer who complies with
Guidelines, or is heard in front of an immigration court that observes the
Interim Procedures, federal judges do not uniformly apply or adhere to the
guidelines. 6 9 Federal judges routinely hear asylum cases appealed from
immigration court by the individual applicant himself. In order to ensure
that children are provided sufficient procedural protection throughout the
judicial system, the same care and cognizance of the special needs of
asylum children requires that federal judges undergo the same training.
Congress has recognized the procedural weaknesses of the 1998
Guidelines and has attempted to address them in the Unaccompanied Alien
Child Protection Act (UACPA). 7 In an effort to further the best interests
of the child, the UACPA requires the detention of children to comply with
Reno by placing unaccompanied children in licensed foster homes, small
group homes, juvenile centers, residential treatment centers or a secured
detention center.' 7' The UACPA also encourages the appointment of a
child advocate professional to meet with unaccompanied minors. 72 The

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

1998 Guidelines, supra note 131, at 1.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (D) (2000)
In re Y-C- 23 I&N Dec. 286, 288 (BIA 2002).
Bien, supranote 126, at 824.
Seugling, supra note 160, at 879.
S.844, 110th Cong. § 401 (2007).
Id.§§ 102(a)(1)(E); 103(a)(3).
Id.§ 201(a)(1).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

27

Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Vol. 21, Iss. 2LAW
[2009], Art. 4
JOURNALLaw,
OFINTERNATIONAL

[Vol. 21

advocate must possess special training on the nature of problems
encountered by unaccompanied children and may not be an employee of
the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security or the
Department of Health and Social Services - a clear acknowledgement by
Congress that a trusted adult may not be sufficient in child-asylum
matters. 73 The UACPA further mandates the development of guidelines74
for the legal representation of alien children in immigration proceedings.1
By requiring the identification of entities that can provide legal assistance,
the UACPA makes substantial effort to ensure
that all unaccompanied
75
counsel.1
competent
to
access
have
children
The UACPA creates substantial improvements to the 1998 Guidelines.
However, the Act can still be greatly improved by addressing the
application of the one-year bar to unaccompanied child asylum seekers as
well as encouraging immigration courts to make child asylum claims a
high priority. One version of the UACPA was passed in the Senate in
2005; however, no action was taken by the House on the bill after March
of 2006.176

The United States has also recently made other changes in asylum law
in light of the atrocities facing child soldiers. The Child Soldier
Accountability Act, which was enacted into law on October 3, 2008,
imposes a fine or 20 year prison term for "knowingly recruiting, enlisting
or conscripting a person under 15 years of age into an armed force or
group.' 1 77 The passage of such a law demonstrates that the United States
acknowledges and is actively attempting to to deal with international
human rights abuses that take place against children. However, the Act
stops short of supplementing the 1998 Guidelines and developing an even
more child-sensitive approach to adjudicating asylum claims that take into
consideration the "best interest of the child."
The implementation of the 1998 Guidelines undoubtedly marked a
significant improvement in the way in which the United States assesses the
asylum claims of children. Indeed, as indicated by the number of
international instruments developed to protect children, the United States
also has an obligation to "ensure that child asylum-seekers receive
173. Id. § 201(a)(2)(A).
174. Id. § 202(a)(5)(A)
175. Id. §§ 202(a)(2), (3)
176. See Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 157; see also U.S. Committee for Refugee and
Immigrants, Update on the Children'sBill, http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=l 515&subm
=75&area=Participate (last visited Feb. 23, 2009)(Noting that "As of March 1, [2006,] the House
version (H.R. 1172), introduced by Representatives Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Chris Smith (R-NJ), and
Chris Cannon (R-UT) had not yet received a vote).
177. Pub. Law No. 110-340 (Oct. 2, 2008).
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adequate care and protection. ' While the Guidelines put the United
States one step closer to doing so, the procedural protections are not
enough. Since the Guideline's implementation ten years ago, children
remain vulnerable to human rights abuses such as forced conscription.179
Broader and more extensive procedural and substantive safeguards for
child asylum seekers are long overdue.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE MEASURES AND CHANGES IN U.S. ASYLUM LAW
Although the 1998 Guidelines, Interim Procedures, and UACPA
expand the procedural protection available to child asylum seekers, "they
do not significantly alter a child's substantiveeligibility under U.S. asylum
law."' 80 Procedural changes are only the first steps to significantly
reforming asylum law to meet the needs of unaccompanied children, like
child soldiers. As Dalrymple notes, procedural improvements only provide
children fairer access to the asylum system. 8 ' While children gain better
access to the asylum system through procedural protections, "the asylum
determination system itself rather than access to it is the main site of
discrimination" toward children."8 2 By continuing to hold children to the
same substantive and evidentiary requirements as adults, children
potentially face the "same harsh consequences . . . faced by
adult[s].... "'83 As a result, child soldiers risk being barred from asylum
and returned to their country to face harm from government or military
armed forces. Substantive changes based on the best interest of the child
principle are essential.
While the 1998 Guidelines recognize the importance of the best
interest of the child standard "for determining appropriate interview
' the Guidelines stop short of
procedures for child asylum seekers,"184
applying the best interest of the child standard to the merits of childasylum claims.' 85 Indeed, the Guidelines explicitly state, "[riegardless of
how sympathetic the child's claim may be, he or she cannot be granted
asylum unless this [refugee] standard is met. Consequently, the 'best

178. Bhabha & Young, Through a Child's Eyes, supra note 4, at 758.
179. Id.
180. Bien, supra note 126, at 826 (emphasis added).
181. Dahymple, supra note 7, at 161.
182. Jacqueline Bhabha, DemocracyandRights: Women, ChildrenandAccess to Asylum, 19
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 227, 243 (2004).
183. Thronson, supra note 12, at 1000.
184. 1998 Guidelines, supra note 131, at 2 (emphasis added).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
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interests of the child' principle, while useful to the interview process, does
not replace or change the refugee definition in determining substantive
eligibility." '86 A closer look at the CRC, suggests a much different
interpretation. As stated in Article 3, the best interest of the child standard
applies to all actions taken concerning children. 87 Therefore, the best
interest of the child is not only relevant to procedural issues but also
substantive questions "pertinent to child asylum claims."' 88 Without
substantive changes, the procedural protections afforded by the 1998
Guidelines have little effect on an asylum officer's decision to grant or
deny asylum to a child.
This part will apply the substantive requirements necessary to obtain
asylum to the case of child soldiers. While child soldiers can make a
successful claim for asylum, this section highlights some of the difficulties
such children potentially face in fitting into the general framework of the
law. Inaddition, this part also describes in detail how child soldiers may
be barred from asylum for their persecution of others, or their participation
or support of a terrorist organization like armed military factions. Finally,
this part argues that these bars to asylum should not apply to children and
furthermore describes defenses for child soldiers facing exclusion.
A. Application of U.S. Asylum Law to ChildSoldiers
For a child soldier to be eligible for asylum, he or she must fit the
definition of a "refugee" as described in the Immigration and Nationality
Act. As Part 1II previously detailed, this requires that a child soldier
demonstrate that he or she suffered persecution in the past or has a wellfounded fear of future persecution. 89 Establishing persecution alone,
however, is not sufficient. The child must- also demonstrate that the
persecution was or will be inflicted on account of one of the five
enumerated grounds listed in the statute. 9° That is, he or she must show
that the persecution was on account of his or her political opinion, religion,
nationality, race, or membership in a particular social group.19 1 As this
section demonstrates, each requirement for asylum presents particularly
difficult hurdles that child soldiers must overcome in order to obtain
protection.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.at 18 (emphasis added).
CRC, supranote 105, art. 3.
Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 147; see also FREEMAN, supra note 113, at 44-50.
See discussion supra PartIV.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2000).
Id.
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1. Defining Past Persecution for Child Soldiers
A child soldier seeking asylum must have been persecuted in the past
or have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of one of the
enumerated grounds.'92 Like adult asylum seekers, a child must
demonstrate that the harm he or she suffered when involved in armed
conflict rose to the level of persecution.' 93 While there is no universal
definition of persecution, the term is generally considered to mean "the
infliction of suffering or harm ... in a way regarded as offensive."194
Persecution may include threats of life, confinement, torture, and
economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life.' 95
The 1998 Guidelines acknowledge that "[t]he harm a child fears or has
suffered, however, may be relatively less than that of an adult and still
qualify as persecution."'9 Given the variations in the psychological makeup of children, and in the circumstances of each case, the Guidelines note
that interpretations as to what constitutes persecution may vary.' 97 The
Guidelines further concede that children may be especially vulnerable to
various forms of human rights violations such as forced labor or sexual
assault.' 9 However, some scholars argue that the Guidelines still fail to
address forms of persecution that are unique to children. 199 For many
children, including child soldiers, the fact that they are children is central
to their claims.2"' Thus, the persecution that child soldiers suffer cannot be
compared to that experienced by an adult, as the persecution is targeted
2 to asylum fails
only at children. The current "adult-centered approach""
to take into account these children's unique circumstances. Immigration
courts have recently acknowledged the specific gender-related claims of
women asylum applicants, noting that women experience persecution

192. Id.
193. Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998).
194. Desirv. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723,727 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102,
107 (9th Cir. 1969)).
195. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985).
196. 1998 Guidelines, supra note 131, at 19.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See,e.g., Bhabha & Young, Not Adults inMiniature,supranote 10, at 101; Bien, supra
note 126, at 831.
200. Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 101.
201. Id.
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differently.20 2 Children's unique experiences of persecution also warrant
acknowledgment of child-specific or child-sensitive claims.
Even for U.S. courts that have been willing to find that the harm
suffered by child soldiers rises to the level of persecution, their
interpretation of what constitutes persecution for children in armed conflict
is problematic. In Lukwago v. INS, for example, the petitioner applied for
asylum based on his experiences as a child soldier in Uganda when he was
15-years old. 2 3 As a young boy, Lukwago not only witnessed his parents
being shot by the LRA, he was also abducted by the rebel group and forced
to perform manual labor under threats of physical harm.2°4 Lukwago was
repeatedly threatened and beaten several times for failing to adhere to
LRA orders.2 5 He even witnessed the killing of at least two children and
was forced to kill his own friend and watch the mutilation of others.20 6 The
Third Circuit concluded that it could "conceive of no reasonable finder 20of7
fact who would not agree that [his harm] qualifies as persecution.,
However, in finding persecution, the court distinguished conscription by
the government from that of conscription by armed forces. 20 ' The Court
noted that while sovereign states enjoy the right to enforce their laws of
conscription, forced conscription by a guerilla organization may constitute
persecution. 20 9 This distinction largely ignores the fact in both cases whether conscripted by the government or by a rebel faction - child
soldiers face the threat of harm and persecution. Indeed, even if the
government's lawful recruitment of children does not in and of itself

202. See Considerationsfor Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims for Women, 8
Immigr. L. Serv. 2d PSD Selected DHS Document 295 (2007). In 1995, prompted by international
concern for gender-related issues, the United States developed guidelines to enhance the ability of
asylum officers to deal more sensitively to substantive and procedural aspects of gender-related
claims. Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women,
Memorandum to INS Asylum Officers (1995) [hereinafter US. Guidelines on Gender-Related
Claims].
203. Lukwago v. INS, 329 F.3d 157, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2002).
204. Id. at 164.
205. Id. at 168.
206. Id. at 169-70.
207. Id. at 170. Under MA. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1990), sovereign nations'
enforcement of its laws of conscription and its penalties for evasion does not constitute persecution.
Id. at 168-69. Furthermore, under INS v. Elias-Zacarias,502 U.S. 478 (1992), recruitment in a
guerilla organization does not necessarily constitute persecution. Id. at 169. The Third Circuit
distinguished Elias-Zacariasby noting that conscription into service by guerillas engaged in attacks
on the established governments can amount to persecution. See Lukwago, 329 F. 3d at 169.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 170.
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constitute persecution, the "treatment meted out to recruits frequently
does."21
Whether recruited by their government or armed rebel factions,
Bhabha and Young point out that due to their age, immaturity, and
vulnerability, children are likely to be more traumatized by hostile
situations than adults.2 ' Punishment that would be considered legitimate
if inflicted on adults could rise to the level of persecution if inflicted on a
child.2" 2 For instance, the abuse that adult soldiers face after conscription
can cause lasting physical and psychological damage if meted out to a
child.213 Moreover, unlike adults, children take seriously improbable
threats of harm and are terrified by unfamiliar situations.2" 4 Thus, seeing
parents abused, conscripted or threatened by government or armed factions
- if children do not undergo such experiences themselves - could
potentially rise to the level of persecution for a child.215 This
acknowledgment of the unique forms of persecution for children would
bring the United States one step closer to providing the necessary
substantive changes for child soldiers.
2. Defining Well-Founded Fear of Persecution for a Child Soldier
An applicant who demonstrates that he or she has suffered past
persecution triggers a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of
future persecution, so long as that fear is related to the past persecution.21 6
Moreover, an applicant who is unable to show past persecution may
210. See Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1143.
211. Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 104.
212. Id. at 105.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 104-05. Two Fourth Circuit cases, in particular, demonstrate the problems child
soldiers face when the courts fail to take a more child-sensitive approach in determining past
persecution in asylum claims. In Garcia-Garciav. INS, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4778 at 2-4 (4th
Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit concluded that despite the fact that a 17-year old was forced to join
a guerilla organization and then subsequently beat a deserter with a baseball bat, those actions did
not constitute as past or future persecution. Similarly, in Cruz-Diaz v. INS, 86 F.3d 330, 331 (4th
Cir. 1996), after a 15-year old asylum applicant from El Salvador testified about his forced
recruitment into a guerilla group and his knowledge of both guerillas and the government army
killing members of his family, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the he did not establish an
objective fear of persecution because the army's hunt for Cruz-Diaz for fighting with guerillas did
not amount to persecution. But see MatterofAristides Luna-Lorenzano (C3/31/98), 2 Immigr. L.
Serv. 2d § 10:190 (2007) (noting that a 16-year old Guatemalan boy was granted asylum after
having been illegally conscripted into the government army and then being subjected to physical,
social and emotional abuse).
216. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2000).
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qualify for asylum by showing that he or she has a well-founded fear of
future persecution on the basis of one of the enumerated grounds. 217 To
establish a well-founded fear, an asylum applicant must show that their
fear is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable."' The 1998
Guidelines recognize that assessing a child's subjective and objective fear
requires sensitivity as "the balance between subjective fear and objective
circumstances may be more difficult for an adjudicator to assess. "219 The
Guidelines suggest that a minor's mental maturity must be determined in
light of his or her own personal, family, or cultural background. 220 The
Interim Procedures, moreover, state that issues of age, development,
experience and self-determination impact how a court deals with a child
respondent.22 '
The courts, in some instances, have been willing to recognize that
child soldiers have a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to their
home countries.222 For example, the atrocious acts committed by children
in some war-tom countries have caused their communities to perceive
them as dangerous and deadly. These communities often strike out against
children, punishing or stigmatizing them, whether or not they served as
child soldiers.223 Moreover, girl soldiers who were forced to bear the
children of adult male combatants are considered defiled and often are not
welcomed home. 224 These children are more than just ostracized - they are
the "object of hatred and suspicion, ' ' 221 often beaten,
abused or even
detained by their government on treason charges. 226 Indeed, children's

217. Lukwago v. INS, 329 F.3d at 174.
218. Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supranote 10, at 114.
219. 1998 Guidelines, supra note 131, at 19.
220. Id.
221. Interim Procedures, supranote 133, at 2.
222. See, e.g., Lukwago v. INS, 329 F.3d 157; Matter ofAseged DanielKebede, 26 Immigr.
Rep. B1-170 (2003).
223. Perlmutter, supranote 5, at 138 (noting that "[e]ven if [child soldiers] travel to a different
village or manage to avoid recruitment, the suspicion that they have been involved makes them
targets of attack.").
224. See, e.g., supra Part III, (describing the experience of young women returning to their
home communities after being involved in armed conflict.); see also Redress Trust, supranote 64,
at 15 (noting that when young girls return to their communities with illegitimate children, the
communities regard the children with shame on the community, sometimes forcing the mother to
choose between the child and the community).
225. CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 164.
226. See, e.g., Lukwago v. INS, 327 F.3d at 175-76 (noting that former LRA child soldiers
have been detained by the government and used to find landmines and arms caches). The 1998
Guidelines, moreover, recognizes that while discriminatory practices and experiences are generally
not regarded as persecution, such experiences "can accumulate overtime or increase in intensity so
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lives are endangered if they are required to return home. As a result, many
child soldiers have a well-founded fear of persecution.
The Guidelines, however, fail to explicitly consider that in some cases
where the persecution suffered was severe, child soldiers may have a wellfounded fear even when there is little chance that they will suffer
persecution if returned to their home country. In Matterof Chen, the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that even if there is no risk of
future persecution, an applicant may still be granted asylum if in the past,
' Some child
he or she "suffered under atrocious forms of persecution."227
soldier cases likely fit under this rubric. Immigration courts and DHS
should remain cognizant of the fact that child soldiers have undergone
tremendous amounts of abuse and, due to their age, this abuse may
seriously and permanently affect their psychological and emotional makeup. By U.S. courts remaining cognizant of the persecution such children
have suffered, some child soldiers should not be denied asylum for lacking
a well-founded fear of future persecution.
3. Persecution by a Government Agent or Other Entity
In order to establish a prima facie case of asylum, the persecutor must
either be a government agent or a non-government entity or person that the
government is unable or unwilling to control.22 8 Courts take into
consideration a number of factors in determining whether a government
is unwilling or unable to control private individuals. Where a
nongovernmental actor is responsible for the persecution, for instance, the
court considers whether an applicant reported incident(s) to the police as
"in such cases a report of this nature may show governmental inability to
' Similarly, a government's response or lack thereof
control the actors."229
is considered relevant.230 The 1998 Guidelines provide no analysis as to
how seeking government protection applies in the case of children. Bhabha
and Young suggest that "[t]he requirement that government protection be
sought presupposes an unmediated relationship between the applicant and

that they may rise to the level of persecution." 1998 Guidelines, supranote 131, at 19 (citing BASIC
LAw MANUAL, 22 (2d ed. 1995).
227. Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989).
228. Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004), rehg en banc granted,382
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
229. Baballah v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2003).
230. See, e.g., Matter of O-Z-& I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998) (noting that where the
applicant reported at least three incidences of anti-Semitic violence to the police, and the police
took no action "beyond writing a report.. ." the government was unwilling or unable to control the
applicant's attackers or protect him).
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the state. 23 1 Indeed, any relationship children have availing themselves of
state protection is likely to involve their parents or relatives. That is,
parents seek protection on behalf of their children - rather than children
seeking it directly. Requiring a child to prove that he or she sought
protection as a precondition to the grant of asylum would effectively bar
such application.232
4. Persecution on Account of Membership in a Particular Social Group
Even if a child soldier is able to demonstrate a past or future fear of
persecution, the persecution suffered must be on account of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.233
The Guidelines recognize that the "on account of' analysis is a critical part
of the analysis under U.S. law, and requires the applicant to provide some
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the harm he or she has
suffered is connected to one of the aforementioned grounds. 3 While
children can and do assert asylum claims under religion, nationality and
race grounds, membership in a particular social group is the ground under
which child soldiers are most likely to qualify. 235 No matter what the
enumerated ground, the Guidelines still require that the child bear the
establishing that he or she falls within a particular category for
burden of
236
asylum.

Although arguably the most frequently invoked ground for asylum,
the definition of a social group has been a matter of controversy.2 37 This
may be due to the fact that this ground was not considered in the original
1951 definition of a refugee but rather included as an afterthought.238 Since
then, U.S. and international jurisprudence on the interpretation of a social
group remains sparse, and U.S. courts have continually struggled to

231. Bhabha & Young, Not Adults in Miniature,supra note 10, at 107.
232. Id. at 108.
233. Perlmutter, supranote 5, at 138.
234. 1998 Guidelines, supranote 131, at 21 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,482
(1991)).
235. See, e.g., Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1141 (stating that
"it is submitted that children who are liable to be recruited into armed forces or groups have a wellfounded fear of persecution because of their membership of a particular social group."); Bhabha
& Young, Not Adults in Miniature, supra note 10, at 111 (stating that "for children, the most
frequent group membership grounding an asylum claim will be membership in their own family
....
").
236. 1998 Guidelines, supra note 131, at *17.
237. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelineson InternationalProtection:Membership
of a ParticularSocial Group, HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002).
238. See generally Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
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construct a precise definition.239 The Ninth Circuit, for example, suggested
that a social group requires "some degree of cohesiveness, cooperation or
inter-dependence between its members.,, 240 The BIA also fashioned a
definition of social group in MatterofAcosta. That case defines 'member
of a social group' as:
an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom
share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or
kinship ties, or in some circumstances, it might be a shared past
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership.
The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under
this construction remains to be determined on a case by case
basis.241
In essence, the MatterofAcosta standard focuses on the immutability
or innateness of the characteristic which defines the social group. Relying
on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning 'of the same kind,' 24 2 the
court looked to the four other enumerated groups to come to its
conclusion. Race, religion, nationality and political opinion, it reasoned,
all described characteristics that the persecuted individuals could not
change, or "should not be required to change because it is fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences., 243 A majority of federal circuits
have adopted the Acosta immutability standard over that of the Ninth
Circuit and other interpretations. 2" Nevertheless, whichever definition is

239. VAN BUEREN, supra note 96, at 362 (citing GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 40, N. 35 (2d. ed. 1996)).
240. Regina v. Immig. Appeal Tribunal, 1 WLR 74 (1998); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d
1571 (9th Cir, 1986).
241. Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211,233 (BIA 1985).
242. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
243. Id. at 233.
244. Other interpretations of membership in a particular social group include "one united by
voluntary association, including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot or should
not be required to change it." Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986).
Alternatively, the Second and Eleventh Circuit devised a definition that focuses on society's
perception of that group. That is, "members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in
question as members of a social group." See In re C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 957 (BIA 2006), aff'd,
Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom.
Castillo-Arias v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 36174 (U.S. Jan. 18,2007) (No. 06-642); Gomez v. INS, 947
F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991). For more extensive analysis of the various social group definitions, see
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applied, "[t]he type of harm a child may suffer cannot serve to define the
particular social group on account of which that particular harm was
suffered."245
Some immigration courts have not been persuaded that the
persecution child soldiers face is on account of their membership in a
social group. One reason argued is that children alone cannot form the
basis of a social group.2 " In Lukwago v. INS, for example, the court
explained that "youth is an important component of a child's identity," but
"unlike innate characteristics, such as sex or color, age changes over time,
possibly lessening its role in personal identity.""247 However, this analysis
is questionable under the Matter ofAcosta social group definition. Matter
of Acosta only requires that the immutable characteristic be one that
members of the social group cannot change. Only time can change youth
to adulthood; not children themselves. Moreover, childhood is
fundamental to a child's identity as required by the Acosta definition. It is
their very youth, immaturity, and vulnerability that make them children
and furthermore, the targets of government and rebel armed forces. Thus,
children alone, perhaps under certain geographic parameters, may
adequately meet the Acosta definition of a social group.
Even by narrowly tailoring the social group, child soldiers in
particular still risk failing the nexus requirement for asylum. Some
scholars and immigration courts point out that while the treatment child
soldiers receive amounts to persecution because they are children, this
persecution does not occur becausethey are children.248 The Third Circuit
in Lukwago agreed with this rationale. In that case, the petitioner argued
that he was persecuted because of his membership in the social group of
"children from Northern Uganda who are abducted and enslaved by the
LRA and oppose their involuntary servitude."'249 The court disagreed,
reasoning that the LRA did not target Lukwago because of his age but
rather "due to its need for labor."25 The court further pointed to the fact
that adults were abducted as well alongside Lukwago.

Bradley B. Banias, Membership in a ParticularSocial Group: Does America Comply with its
InternationalObligations?,1 CHARLESTON L. REV. 123, 136-42 (2007).
245. 1998 Guidelines, supranote 131, at 23; see also Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172.
246. See, e.g., Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171; see also Bhabha& Young, Not Adults in Miniature,
supra note 10, at 111 (stating that "[b]road demographics such as gender or age alone are unlikely
to be sufficient characteristics for this ground, though they may be one of several factors
determining the parameters of a social group.").
247. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171.
248. CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 163.
249. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171-72.
250. Id. at 173.
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While child soldiers and adults are equally recruited, that should not
undermine the fact that child soldiers are particularly targeted and
persecuted because of their age and vulnerability. As discussed in Part II
of this Article, children are seen as possessing special qualities that set
" ' They are targeted for their ability to be
them apart from adults.25
manipulated into committing atrocities. Considered expendable, they serve
as spies, or mine layers - often doing jobs that adults are unable to
perform. Even as young children, child soldiers can carry weaponry and
shoulder the demands of armed conflict without questioning their military
leaders like adults. The LRA, for example, makes the "[t]aking [of]
children a systematic choice [with] most of those abducted.. . between 13
' as older youths are less malleable. Other courts
and 16 years old"252
presented with similar evidence might find it sufficient to establish that the
persecution a child soldier suffered was on account of his membership in
a particular social group.
Fortunately, courts in other jurisdictions have begun to grant asylum
to child soldiers on account of their membership in a particular social
group.5 3 A variety of forms of social group descriptions have been
successful such as 'children who fear persecution because of their
membership in their family,' 'children who have been traumatized by
witnessing the persecution of their parent'254 and 'former child soldiers
[stigmatized by their communities].'255 The underlying success of these
cases is the immutable quality that characterizes the social group.
Membership in a family or experience witnessing trauma is something that
cannot be changed. Nor can children's former experience as child soldiers
be washed away to avoid the stigmatization they face in their communities.
In light of the success of these claims, immigration courts should not
ignore the fact that children, due to their age and vulnerability, are hand
picked by military and armed forces alike to serve in armed conflict. It is
their expendability and ability to be manipulated that make child soldiers
the targets of warfare and persecution. This persecution takes place on
account of their membership in a social group of child soldiers.
251. SupraPartlIl.
252. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 173.
253. See, e.g., Anne Marie Gallagher, Proving Well-Founded Fearof Persecution,2 Immig.
L. Serv. 2d § 10:190 (2007) (one successful social group for child soldiers includes "underage males
forcibly recruited and illegally conscripted into the military who have been subjected to physical,
social and emotional abuse.").
254. Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) ("There can, in fact, be no plainer
example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that
of the nuclear family.").
255. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 177-78.
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Overall, the inability to take a more child-sensitive approach in
applying the definition of asylum endangers child soldiers in asylum
proceedings. Without asylum officers and judges taking into account their
vulnerability, the circumstances in which they have become involved in
armed conflict, and its lasting emotional and psychological effects, child
soldiers may not qualify for asylum at all. This is not to suggest that child
soldiers can never assert successful asylum claims. However, immigration
courts and asylum officers should not so narrowly interpret asylum
requirements so as to deny refugee protection to child soldiers who do not
easily fit within the rigid framework of the law. The circumstances facing
child soldiers are unique and their cases require special attention and care.
Procedural protections are a good start. However, taking into account their
status as children in the substantive analysis of their asylum claims is
essential.
B. Access Denied: Exclusionfrom Asylum Under the Refugee
Convention and the Immigration and NationalityAct
Even if a child soldier is able to establish prima facie eligibility for
asylum, these children may still not qualify for asylum due to their past
actions as soldiers. Although they are victims of human rights violations,
child soldiers have nonetheless often participated in the maiming and
killing of others. This type of conduct subjects child soldiers to exclusion
from asylum under Article IF(a) of the Exclusion Clause as well as the
U.S. asylum bars. However, this section argues that barring child soldiers,
without taking into account their status as children, is clearly contrary to
1998 Guideline's goals to "[i]ncreas[e] the understanding of and
sensitivity to children's issues... "256 as well as the U.S. obligations under
international law. This section will examine the 1951 Convention's bars
from asylum. This section will then compare the U.S. asylum bars,
suggesting that the United States has misinterpreted the 1951 Convention
in its own statutory regulations. This section argues that the United States
should incorporate defenses to bars of asylum to ensure that children like
child soldiers are not unfairly excluded from the protection they deserve.
1. Exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention
Under Article IF(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, states are
prohibited from granting refugee status "to any person with respect to
whom there are serious reasons for considering that: he has committed a

256. 1998 Guidelines, supranote 131, at 2.
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crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity .... ,,257 The
rationale of Article 1F(a) is that certain persons do not deserve protection
as refugees because of the serious transgressions that they committed.258
The institution of asylum would lose all reliability "if persons who have
persecuted others .... could receive refugee protection alongside their
victims .... , 259 Thus, none of the protections under the 1951 Convention
are available to those who have engaged in war crimes or other atrocities.
The rationale for Article 1F(a) extends to all persons, regardless of
their age. Children are therefore not excluded from the ambit of the
Article. 260 Thus, if there are serious reasons for considering that a child has
committed a war crime, for example, then a state is prohibited from
granting him or her asylum. 26' Because of some of the atrocious acts child
soldiers have committed, they are particularly likely to be subject to
exclusion under Article 1F(a).
As stated in Article IF(a), there are three specific crimes which, if
committed, exclude a person from the protection of refuge and asylum.
Those include crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against
humanity. 262 A crime against peace consists of "'planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances.' ' 263 Because neither
soldiers nor civilians supporting a war or armed conflict were intended to

257. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. IF, July 28, 1951 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafterRefugee Convention]. Happold argues that while Article 1F is written in mandatory
language, thus granting States no discretion as to whether to grant refugee status to persons
reasonably suspected to have been involved in war crimes, etc., the provision's drafting history
indicates that states are prohibited from granting refugee status in such circumstances. Excluding
Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1134.
258. See Michael Kingsley Nyinah, Reflection, Exclusion UnderArticleIF: Some Reflections
on Context, Principlesand Practice, 12 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 295, 296 (special ed. 2000).
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Sibylle Kapfere, Exclusion Clauses in Europe - A Comparative Overview of
State Practicein France,Belgium and the United Kingdom, 12 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 195 (special
ed. 2000) (an applicant from Burma who had joined an armed opposition group and received
guerilla training from the ages of 9-14, after he and his family had suffered abused by the Burmese
military, was denied asylum in France where the courts decision did not reflect any consideration
of his age); Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submissionfrom the U.S. Campaignto Stop
the Use of Child Soldiers to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, * 1. (Nov. 2007), available
at www.child-soldiers.org/doc-904 (noting that "under existing U.S. law, the U.S. government has
opposed asylum claims from former child soldier from other countries on the grounds that they
participated in the persecution of others.").
261. Refugee Convention, supra note 257, art. IF(a).
262. Id.
263. Gallagher, supra note 13, at 316-17.
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be punished under this provision, child soldiers are not likely to be
excluded for committing a crime against peace." 6
War crimes, however, are considered "violations of the laws or
customs of war" and include murder, ill-treatment or deportation of
civilians, and the wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages. 265 Similar
to war crimes but on a larger scale, crimes against humanity generally
refer to any fundamentally inhumane treatment of the population.266 While
child soldiers typically do not engage in the destruction of vast areas, but
rather commit single rampages at a time following orders and commands,
both the war crimes and the crimes against humanity provisions are likely
to apply to child soldiers as well.267
While these provisions extend to all persons, given the broad
implications of the Exclusion Clause, Article 1F(a) needs to be carefully
considered before being applied to children. First, it should be noted that,
in general, Article 1F(a) does not distinguish between children and adults
because the drafters failed to take into account that such provisions would
ever be applied to children.268 In the wake of World War II, the drafters of
the Convention acknowledged that certain types of crimes committed were
"so horrendous that they justified exclusion of the perpetrators from the
benefits of refugee status., 269 Thus, drafted with the war in mind, this
provision was meant to apply to German soldiers. The participation of
children in armed conflict was not yet considered a problem of
international concern.
Today, the situation with children in armed conflict is very different
and certainly contrary to what the drafters of Article IF intended. Unlike
the adult soldiers during World War II, children today are forced under
unique circumstances to serve. Some child soldiers witness the deaths of
their entire families before they are forcibly conscripted.270 Others are

264. Perlmutter, supra note 5, at 143.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 319 (citing I. BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 566 (Oxford
University Press, 5th ed. 1999)).
267. Perlmutter, supra note 5, at 144.
268. Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1135. The drafters only
considered those "with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that they have
committed a crime." Id. at 1133.
269. See Lisbon Expert Roundtable EC/GC/01/2Track/l, 30 May 2001; see also Lori K.
Walls, Comment, The PersecutorBar in U.S. ImmigrationLaw, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 227,
229 ("persecutor bar in immigration law arose in response to Congressional concern that, in the
midst of the political and social upheaval that followed the end of World War II, Nazi war criminals
were entering the United States undetected").
270. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2002).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss2/4

42

Everett: The Battle Continues:
Fighting
for a More Child-Sensitive Approac
ASYLUMFOR
CHILD SOLDIERS

taken from their schools and communities and then forcibly recruited into
army or rebel ranks.27 ' Child soldiers moreover, place their lives at risk by
failing to comply with the orders of their commanders or by attempting to
escape.272 As previously described, child solders are beaten or killed by
their adult commanders.273 Girl soldiers are raped and subjected to other
forms of sexual abuse.27 Boys and girls alike are drugged and then
coerced to commit atrocities.27 Their very circumstances amount to
persecution and have given rise to the international community
recognizing them as victims rather than violators.276 Given the extreme
circumstances under which child soldiers are forced to serve, child soldiers
remain deserving of the benefits of refuge and asylum abroad.
Moreover, indiscriminately applying this provision to children directly
contradicts national and international efforts to stop the use of children in
armed conflict. Human rights activists and international humanitarian
organizations have embarked on a massive campaign to combat the use of
child soldiers.277 The Convention of the Rights ofthe Child recognizes that
children under the age 15 are entitled to special protection from
recruitment and use in armed forces.27 Furthermore, the Optional
Protocol, to which the United States is a party, requires states to take "all
feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have
not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities."279
This non-recruitment of children under 18 extends to rebel groups in
internal conflicts as well.2"' While the Protocol does not address a State's
obligations toward former child soldiers as refugees, Article 6 nonetheless
requires that states "take all feasible measures to ensure that children
recruited or used in hostilities" are demobilized and accorded "all
appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and

271. See, e.g., MCDONNEL&AKALLO,supra note 24, at 22 (describing how the LRA abducted
many girls from secondary school).
272. Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1137.
273. Id.at 1138.
274. Id. at 1138-39.
275. Id. at 1139.
276. Id. at 1135.
277. Bien, supra note 126, at 839.
278. CRC, supranote 105, art. 38.
279. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. art. 1, G.A. Res. 54/263,
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Optional Protocol]; see also TINY VANDEWIELE,
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL: THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT, A COMMENTARY ON
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 21 (2006).
280. Optional Protocol, supra note 279, art. 4.
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their social reintegration., 28 ' These policies indicate that forced
conscription is a violation of children's rights and that the children used
are victims of those crimes. Child soldiers' unique classification as victims
of crime rather than violators then strongly implies that Article IF(a)
should be carefully - and rarely - applied to children.
Both international and non-profit organizations have stepped forward
to ensure that Article 1F(a) is not haphazardly applied to children's cases.
In setting out to ensure that children would be given special consideration
before the exclusion clause applies, the UNHCR, for example,
promulgated guidelines on the application of Article IF(a) to children.28 2
The UNHCR Guidelines emphasize that "[g]reat caution should always be
exercised... when the application of the exclusion clause is being
considered in relation to a minor. ,283 Thus, while the exclusion clause
applies to children in principle, it should not be done so before individual
responsibility has been established and the child facing exclusion has
availed him or herself to a number of defenses. 2 4
In general, Article IF(a) requires evidence of individual responsibility
for the crimes committed.285 Individual responsibility generally only arises
where one "committed, or made a substantial contribution to [the
commission ofj a criminal act, in the knowledge that his or her act or
omission would facilitate the criminal conduct., 286 In other words, in order
to be guilty of a crime, there must be a mens rea and absence of a defense
in addition to actus reus before the exclusion clause applies. 7 Where the
mental element is not satisfied, for example, because the individual did not
have the mental capacity to be held responsible for a crime, individual
responsibility cannot be established.
The UNCHR's Guidelines emphasize that child soldiers may escape
criminal liability by demonstrating that they lacked the requisite "guilty

281. Id. art. 6; Bien, supra note 126, at 839.
282. U.N. High Comm'r on Refugees, BackgroundNote on the Application of the Exclusion
Clauses: Article IF of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees at 34, within
Guidelinesfor InternationalProtection:Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article IF of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, (HCR/GIP/03/05) (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter
UNCHR Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses].
283. Id.
284. See also Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1146-73 (discussing
defenses for child soldiers facing exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F(a)).
285. UNCHR Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, supra note 282, at 19.
286. Id (emphasis added).
287. Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1146-47.
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mind" in their actions during armed conflict.288 Referring to international
law, which requires states set a minimum age for criminal liability to
apply,289 the Guidelines assert that children below that age may not be
considered to have committed an excludable offense.29 ° In light of these
international principles, infancy is a viable defense for children facing
" ' For children below the minimum age limit a
exclusion from asylum.29
lack of mens rea is presumed - and by virtue of that presumption, they
escape criminal liability for their acts.292
Even if a child cannot avail him or herself to an infancy defense, the
Guidelines stress that the child could still assert duress as a defense.
Unlike infancy, a defendant asserting duress is not suggesting that he or
she "did not intend to do what he did, but rather that, faced with imminent
and unavoidable threat aimed at persuading him to commit an offense, he
had no viable alternative but to do what he was told. 29 3 Black's Law
Dictionary defines duress as "a threat of harm made to compel a person to
do something against his or her will or judgment" or "[t]he use or
' A duress defense typically applies
threatened use of unlawful force."294
when a person acts in order to avoid serious bodily harm to him or herself
or another and that person does not intend to cause greater harm than what
was sought to be avoided.295

288. UNCHR Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, supra note 282, at 34 (noting
that the exclusion clauses may apply to minors but only if they have reached the age of criminal
liability. "The younger the child, the greater the presumption that such mental capacity did not exist
at the relevant time."); see alsoExcluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supranote 13, at 1146-47
(noting that it is not enough to simply have done a prohibited act; "there must be the requisite mens
rea as well as the actus reus.").
289. U.N. High Comm'r on Refugees, Summary Conclusions:Exclusionfrom Refugee Status,
4 EC/GC/01/2Trackl (May 2001) [hereinafter UNHCR Summary Conclusions]; see also The
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 40 (requiring States to establishing a minimum age
for criminal responsibility); U.N. Standard Minimum Rules of the Administration of Juvenile
Justice art. 4 (Nov. 1985) (urging states in establishing a minimum age, to ensure that the starting
age is not fixed at too low a level); Excluding ChildrenfromRefugee Status, supra note 13, at 1148.
290. See also Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1147-48.
291. Id.at 1148. Indiscussing the infancy defense, Happold notes that children are considered
"doli incapax; incapable of evil" and therefore, where they fall below the minimum age a State
establishes for criminal liability, there cannot be "'serious reasons for considering' that a child has
committed a... crime" that would render him or her excludable under Article IF(a). Id. at 1147.
292. Id; see also UNHCR Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, supra note 282,
at 34 (stating that "[t]he younger the child, the greater the presumption that such mental capacity
did not exist at the time.").
293. Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1162.
294. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
295. U.N. High Comm'r on Refugees, Guidelines on InternationalProtection:Application
of the Exclusion Clauses: Article IF of the 1951 Convention relatingto the Status or Refugees,
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In fact, the UNCHR Guidelines emphasize that duress may be an
especially viable defense against the application of Article IF for child
soldiers. 296 As discussed previously, "[m]ilitary and rebel recruiters prey
upon children precisely because of their physical and psychological
' They are to kill or be killed; join the military or armed
vulnerability."297
faction or suffer the consequences of their own death or the death of
others.298 Even those who "voluntarily" join government or rebel armed
forces operate under duress and coercion as they "see few alternatives to
involvement in armed conflict. Some enlist as a means of survival in wartorn regions . . . after seeing family members tortured or killed by
government forces or armed groups."2 99 With no parents or family to
provide for them, enlisting in military groups is their only means to food
and other resources. Even those with their families intact are forced to join
because of poverty and lack of work or educational opportunities.3 °0
Indeed, child soldiers lack "the maturity to make a real choice whether or
not to join an armed group." '' Given the unique circumstances facing
child soldiers, the UNHCR encourages states to consider factors such as
the age of the [child] at the time of becoming involved with the
armed group; the reasons for joining (was it voluntary or coerced
or in defense of oneself or others?); the consequences of refusal
to join; the length of time as a member; [alternatives to the]
possibility of not participating in such acts or of escape; the
forced use of drugs [or involuntary intoxication.. .]the level of
education and understanding of the events in question; and the
trauma, abuse or ill-treatment suffered by the child as a result of
his or her involvement.0 2
Moreover, even if no viable duress or involuntary intoxication defense
exists, the Guidelines urge states to take into consideration the

22, HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 2003).
296. UNHCR Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, supra note 282, at 34
(stressing that States should give considerable attention to child soldier cases in order to determine
if defenses like duress exist to reject criminal liability and the application of Article IF).
297. Bien, supra note 126, at 837.
298. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, supra,note 19.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1172.
302. UNHCR Note onf the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, supranote 282, at 34.
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vulnerability of the child,
303 especially those subjected to ill-treatment, as
child soldiers often are.
Above all, however, the Guidelines note that the Convention on the
Rights of the Child's "best interest of the child" standard should at all
times be a state's primary consideration before applying Article 1F(a).3 4
This would include, for example, states incorporating individuals specially
trained in child welfare when adjudicating the claims of child soldiers.30 5
Ultimately, by referring to states' international commitments to protect
child soldiers and other children under the CRC and the Optional Protocol,
the Guidelines encourage the treatment and rehabilitation of child soldiers
rather than their exclusion from protection under Article IF.3 °6
Guidelines like those promulgated by UNCHR underscore the fact that
Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention was by no means intended to exclude
from asylum those deserving of protection like children. Rather, the
Exclusion Clause was intended to be exceptional in nature and applied
"scrupulously and restrictively because of the potential serious
consequences of exclusion from refugee status for the individual
concerned., 3 7 In light of World War 11 and the Holocaust, there was little
difficulty in determining who could be considered a perpetrator and
"undeserving of refugee protection" under Article IF.3 8 Today, the line
between perpetrator and victim is less clear. 3 ' 9 This is especially true in the
case of child soldiers. In light of such changes in warfare and the blur
between victims and victimizers, access to criminal defenses like
Guidelines suggest is essential to curtailing the harsh effects of Article
IF.3 10 Even in light of some of the horrendous offenses committed by child
soldiers, they still remain deserving of refuge and protection. Thus, for
those child soldiers falling within the ambit of Article 1F(a), states should
stop, think, and seriously consider a child's unique circumstances and any
defenses available to them to avoid criminal liability and exclusion from
protection.

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. UNHCR Summary Conclusions,supranote 289, 3.
308. Id.
309. See also Walls, supra note 269, at 227 (noting that for the exclusion bars under the INA,
"the relationship between persecutor and persecuted "has proven to be less tidy.").
310. UNCHR Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, supra note 282.
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2. Exclusion from asylum under the Immigration & Nationality
Act (INA)
Like the 1951 Refugee Convention, the United States created similar
exclusionary provisions (or bars to asylum) in the INA. Overall, there are
" '
there are approximately ten statutory bars to asylum in the INA.31
However, this section will focus specifically on section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) in
comparison to Article IF(a) of the 1951 Convention. Under section
208(b)(2)(A)(i), an alien is considered ineligible for asylum if he or she
"ordered, incited or assisted or participated in the persecution of any
person on account of one" of the five enumerated grounds.312
Like the 1951 Convention, section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) was drafted with
the actions of German soldiers in World War II in mind.313 In the aftermath
of the war, the United States enacted the 1948 Displaced Persons Act to
admit those who either could not or did not want to return to their home
countries.314 While authorizing 200,000 displaced persons to enter the
United States, the Displaced Persons Act also stipulated that any person
"who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or
groups of persons because of race, religion, or national origin" was
prohibited from entering or remaining in the United States.3 15 The INA
followed suit by similarly subjecting those who failed16to disclose their
participation as a Nazi in World War II to deportation.
The INA's "past persecutor" bar has not been extensively analyzed in
the asylum context.3" 7 What case law that is available on the interpretation
311. These include exclusion for the persecution of others (INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(i); particularly
serious crime INA (§ 208(b)(2)(A)(ii)); serious non-political crime (INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iv);
terrorist activity (INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v); firm resettlement (INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(vi); aggravated
felony (INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i). Other procedural bars to asylum include an asylees access to a safe
third country (INA § 208(a)(2)); one year time limitation to apply for asylum (INA § 208(a)(2)(A);
previous denial of asylum(INA § 208(a)(2)(C)). For detailed discussion of each bar, see ROBERT
JOBE ET. AL., WINNING AsYLuM CASES (4th ed. 2004).
312. See 8 U.S.C.A § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i); INA § 101(a)(42)(A).
313. Walls, supranote 269, at 229.
314. Id. at 229-30.
315. Displaced Persons Act, 262 Stat. 555 (1950); see also United State Holocaust Memorial
Museum, Displaced Persons, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang--en&Moduleld=
10005462.
316. Walls, supranote 269, at 230; INA § 340(a).
317. See Matter of Kebede, 26 Immig. Rptr. B1-170 at *6 (BIA 2003)(Espenoza, J.,
concurring) (describing § 208(b)(2)(A)(i) as "past persecutor" bar and noting the limited
jurisprudence available on this INA provision); see also Ofusu v. McElroy, 98 F.3d 694, 701 (2d.
Cir. 1996) (stating that "we have never addressed the meaning of the phrase... 'assisted, or...
participated in [the] persecution' as employed in the exception to the definition of a refugee... in
this or any other jurisdiction interpreting the pertinent language.").
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of this provision has referred, in large part, to the 1948 Displaced Person's
Act rather than to any interpretations of Article IF(a) of the Refugee
Convention.318 As a result, exclusion under section 208 is vastly different
than Article IF(a) and its focus on criminal responsibility. In effect, as
explained below, section 208 is much broader in scope and potentially
excludes far more individuals from asylum than Article 1F(a).
Courts discussing the "past persecutor" bar have reasoned that
because the language of section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) is similar to that of the
Nazi war criminal exclusion and deportation provisions, both should be
interpreted consistently.319 The BIA, in fact, used the Nazi deportation
provisions to interpret the "persecution of others" phrase in the INA. For
example, in Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, persons who simply serve as
regular soldiers or guerillas and fight against other combatants of war do
not engage in the persecution of others.32° On the other hand, wartime
attacks against civilians fall within the scope of the bar if committed on
one of the enumerated grounds.2
A more difficult question is what defines "assisted or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person" for purposes of section
208(b)(2)(A)(i).322 Courts are split on whether an individual's personal
involvement in the persecution of others is required. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, held that the mere fact that someone is associated with an
enterprise that engaged in persecution is not sufficient. 323 Rather, the Ninth
Circuit focused on whether the asylum applicant had active personal
involvement in the persecution of others.324 In other circuits, the assistance
language of section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) has been interpreted more broadly.
Thus, having simply served in a military battalion without proof of

318. See, e.g., Im v. Gonzales, 497 F. 3d 990(9th Cir. 2007); Frederenko v. United States, 449
U.S. 490 (1981); Miranda v. Alvarado, 449 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d
736 (7th Cir. 2005).
319. See, e.g., Firestone v. Howerton, 671 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1982).
320. Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811, 816 (BIA 1988).
321. MatterofMcMullen, 19 1. & N. Dec. 90, 95-96 (BIA 1984); see also JOBE ET AL., SUpra
note 311, at 5-2.
322. INA § 208(b)(3)(A)(i).
323. Xu Sheng Gao v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 93, 99 (9th Cir. 2007)(stating that "guilt by
association" is not sufficient).
324. Im v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007)(stating that materiality of an
applicant's act is measured by examining the degree of relation his acts had to the persecution itself.
That is, "[h]ow instrumental to the persecutory end were those acts? Did those acts further the
persecution, or were they tangential to it?").
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participating in executing others has been considered sufficient for section
208.325

No matter what interpretation is used, courts uniformly agree that, in
determining whether an asylum applicant assisted in the persecution other
others, the focus is on the objective effect of the persecution and not the
persecutor's state of mind.3 26 For example,

an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates
before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the
persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there can be no
question that a guard who was... armed with a rifle and a pistol
...and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders
from the commandment of the camp, fits within the statutory
language about persons who assisted in the persecution of
civilians.327

If the effect of an applicant's actions rises to the level of persecution of
others, he or she is excludable under section 208(b)(2)(A)(i). The question
of the asylum applicant's personal motivation is not relevant.32 Nor is
whether the applicant shared in the authorities' intentions.329
The focus on the objective effect of the persecution in section
208(b)(2)(A)(i) has very serious implications for those who fall under its
scope. By limiting the focus on persecution alone, in effect, whether an
applicant acted under duress or any other circumstance is not taken into
account before the past persecutor bar is applied. Indeed, immigration
courts have held that "although a defense to criminal prosecution, duress
cannot be pleaded in the context of exclusion proceedings."33 Assistance,
even if compelled, may meet the statutory requirements.33'
The rationale for barring a duress defense in exclusion proceedings
stems, in large part, from the Supreme Court's holding in Federenko v.
United States.3 32 In that case, Federenko applied for and was granted

325. Naujalis v. INS, 240 F.3d 642,646 (7th Cir. 2001). See generally Walls, supra note 269,
at 232-33.
326. Rodriquez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 815.
327. Federenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 514 (1981).
328. Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2005).
329. Id.; Neguise v. Gonzales, 231 F.App'x 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007); Laipeneks, 18 I. & N.
Dec. at 464.
330. Excluding Children from Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1158.
331. Federenko., 449 U.S. at 512 (1981).
332. Id.
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admission into the United States through the Displaced Person's Act.333
The government later brought deportation charges against him because he
served as a concentration camp guard during World War H.33'Federenko
335
argued that he was under duress and was forced to serve as a guard;
however, the Supreme Court held that there was no "involuntary
assistance" exception to the Displaced Person's Act.336 Rather, the Act only
required inquiry into "whether particular conduct can be considered
assisting in the persecution" of others. 337 Thus, the Court concluded that
"all those who assisted in the persecutions of civilians [are] ineligible for
visas., 338 The Court's holding has been incorporated in subsequent asylum
cases. Now, for section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) to apply, "the participation or
assistance of an alien
in persecution need not be of his own volition to bar
339
him from relief.,
The U.S. focus on objective effect of the persecution rather than on an
individual's culpability adversely affects child soldiers in particular. For
some child soldiers who only served as porters or cooks, their actions
while in armed conflict likely do not amount to the persecution of others
34
and, therefore, the past persecutor provision of the INA would not apply.
For others who, under the threat of death, shot at innocent children and
civilians, laid down landmines, or killed their own families, the past
persecutor bar offers no safe harbor.
Indeed, the breadth of section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) has adversely affected
the asylum claims of former child soldiers. For example, in Matter of
Aseged Daniel Kedebe, a 14-year old boy "was conscripted into the
Ethiopian army and sent to fight in Eritrea. ' '34' During that time, Kedebe
was threatened that if he did not fire on the targeted children and civilians
using machine guns and explosive devices, he would be killed.342 A young
soldier, who only pretended to fire shots with his gun, was killed in front
of Kedebe and others. 343 Another soldier who tried to escape was also

333. Id. at 496-97.
334. Id. at 493.
335. Id.at 500.
336. Id. at 512.
337. Id. at 514, n. 34.
338. Id. at 512.
339. Rodriquez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 814.
340. But see PartVI infra (discussing the implications of the material support provision under
section 212(a)(3)(B) to child soldiers).
341. Kebede, 26 Imniig. Rptr. Bl-170 at *4.
342. Id.
343. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

51

336

INTERNATIONAL
FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
Florida Journal of
International
Law,
Vol. 21, Iss.LAW
2 [2009], Art. 4

[Vol. 21

killed by the military in front of 2,000 soldiers. 3 " Those who killed him
said that he did not] love his country.3 45 Despite Kedebe's testimony, the
immigration judge denied asylum because he was a "past persecutor"
pursuant to section 208(b)(2)(A)(i).346 The BIA similarly dismissed his
appeal. 347 The Coalition to the Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has
furthermore suggested that the United States continues to oppose asylum
claims of some child soldiers on the grounds that they are persecutors.348
Unlike the UNCHR Guidelines, neither the 1998 U.S. Guidelines for Child
Asylum Claims nor any other known document offers any guidance to ease
the application of this exclusion bar to children.
The U.S. reliance on the Displaced Person's Act and its statutory focus
on persecution is a clear misinterpretation of Article IF(a) of the 1951
Convention. Unlike section 208(b)(2)(A)(i), Article lF(a) focuses on
crimes or the criminal acts of those who face exclusion.3 49 Therefore, as
previously discussed, Article I F(a) requires that there be some individual
culpability before it applies.
States, therefore, must look for the requisite actus reus, mens rea, and
available defenses before determining whether the individual is culpable.
Section 208(b)(2)(A)(i), as it is interpreted, affords no such protection to
those subject to its provisions. By limiting its focus only to the objective
effect of the persecution and ignoring any other possible reasons for an
asylum applicant's actions, such as duress, involuntary drug use or
intoxication, section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) is drastically overinclusive, barring
those who are otherwise worthy of refuge and protection.
As a "de-facto" party to the Refugee Convention, the United States is
at least obligated under international law to refrain from acts that would

344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at *2.
347. As described in later detail, three years later the BIA reconsidered Kedebe's case and
remanded the case to the Immigration Judge to address the merits of Kedebe's claim and consider
whether his actions as a conscript in the Ethiopian army constituted as persecution on account of
an enumerated ground within the meaning of INA sections 208(b)(2)(A)(i) and 101 (a)(42). Id. The
"past persecution" bar has also been used to bar other deserving applicants as well. See generally,
Walls, supra note 269, at 237-38.
348. U.S. Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers to the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, United States ofAmerica: Compliancewith the OptionalProtocolto the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 10 (2007) available at
www.child-soldiers.org/doc904 [hereinafter U.S. Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers].
349. Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1161(noting that because
Article IF(a) speaks specifically of crimes, it would seem to be a "clear implication that general
part of criminal law should apply.").
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undermine the Convention.35 ° The INA's focus only on persecution is an
impermissible reading of Article IF(a). In essence, the current statutory
language of section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) is wrong in principle and is "in no way
relevant to the interpretation of Article IF."35
"'
Furthermore, some suggest that a closer reading of Federenkoactually
supports the use defenses such as the duress defense in exclusion
proceedings in the United States.352 Other courts interpreting Federenko
have held that "a court faced with 'difficult line drawing problems' should
engage in a particularized evaluation in order to determine whether an
individual's behavior was culpable., 35 3 Thus, all aspects of an individuals
actions should be taken into consideration before the past persecution bar
applies to ensure that the individual actually carries some "degree of
personal [criminal] . . .responsibility., 354 Any absence of personal
responsibility, regardless of the objective effect of an individual's actions,
would render the exclusion bar inapplicable.
Immigration courts have begun to sign onto this rationale, particularly
in the context of asylum claims from child soldiers. The concurrence in
Matter of Aseged Daniel Kebede, for example, emphasized that
immigration courts faced with determining whether an individual is subject
to the "past persecutor" depends on an assessment of his "personal
culpability in the acts amounting to persecution., 355 The concurrence thus
found it essential to examine "all aspects relevant to the individuals
conduct" before making its determination as to the applicability of the past
persecutor bar.356 While sovereign governments generally have the right to
conscript their citizens into the military, the concurrence noted that, that
right does not extend to children. 357 Rather, under international law,
particularly under the CRC, nations are prohibited from permitting or

350. Bien, supra note 126, at 811.
351. Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status, supra note 13, at 1162.
352. See, e.g., GREGORY F. LAUFER, IN SUPPORT OF A DURESS

EXCEPTION TO THE

456
(2006), http://www.ailf.org/awards/dubroff/dubroff_2006.pdf (arguing that based on lower courts
interpretation of Federenko, courts should adopt a totality-of the-circumstances approach to
assessing whether an asylum applicant was personally liable in his or her support for a terrorist
organization pursuant to section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Kebede, 26 Immig. Rptr. BI-170 at *5 (citing Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806,813 (8th
Cir. 2001).
356. LAUFER, supra note 352, at 456.
357. Id.
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY AcT's "MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM" PROVISION
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requiring children to participate in fighting wars. 358 Therefore, courts
"ought not disqualify an alien from asylum merely for obeying military
orders that were issued and enforced under threat of death. This is so
particularly where the soldier in question was only a child at the time of the
events at issue., '359 Although this was a non-precedent decision, it
nevertheless suggests that duress defense is available to former child
soldiers who face exclusion.
Like the UNHCR Guidelines suggests, in child asylum cases,
consideration of other defenses should be extended, if doing so would
render the exclusion bar inapplicable. 36' An immigration or federal court
might consider in the case of a child soldier, whether the child was acting
in self-defense, was involuntarily intoxicated or drugged, or was too young
to have the requisite mental capacity to understand his or her actions.361
While such defenses may not be viable in some jurisdictions, courts should
still incorporate the CRC's best interest of the child standard into its
analysis of the exclusionary bar.
Indeed, treating children who have committed criminal acts differently
than adults is not a new phenomenon under U.S. criminal law. Since its
inception, the juvenile justice system has recognized the "vulnerability and
intellectual constraints of minors and [sought to] ... protect the child by
providing child sensitive legal standards and guidelines., 362 Thus, the
purpose of the juvenile justice system was to treat and rehabilitate juvenile
criminals, not punish them.363 The similarities between the underlying
purpose of the juvenile system and that of the CRC are compelling. As a
signatory to the CRC and a party to a number of international instruments
protecting the needs of children, the United States should "narrowly
fashion the parameters of exclusion so as to take due cognizance of
358. Kebede, 26 Immig. Rptr, B1-170 at *7.
359. Id. at *8.

360. See UNHCR Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, supra note 282, at 34.
361. Establishing an infancy defense, however, is difficult under current U.S. criminal law.
Historically, under common law, the defense of infancy presumed that children under the age of
fourteen lacked the capacity to commit a crime. Children under the age of seven were conclusively
presumed to lack capacity while children between the ages of seven and fourteen were presumed
to be without capacity, but this could be rebutted. Robert H. Mnookin & D. Kelly Weisberg, CHILD,
FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIAL ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 1247 (4th ed. 2000).

With the inception of the juvenile court system, today, the infancy defense is only available in a
few jurisdictions. Id. at 1248; see also Tim A. Thomas, Defense oflnfancy in JuvenileDelinquency
Proceedings,83 A.L.R. 4th 1135 (1991).

362. See Nogosek, supranote 92, at 13-14.
363. However, it should be acknowledged that the American criminal law system is an area
of law that is quickly merging into a consistent set of substantive and procedural rules for adults
and children. Id.
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[children's] special status." 3" Incorporating the "best interest of the child"
standard and as well as ensuring that defenses remain available to children
like child soldiers facing exclusion under section 208(b)(2)(A)(i) is the
best way to do so.
C. Exclusion Under the INA "MaterialSupportfor
Terrorism" Provision
Even if child soldiers are able to surpass the "past persecutor" bar,
these children may still be excluded from asylum in the United States for
having engaged in terrorist activities or provided "material support" to a
terrorist organization. Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA states that an alien
is considered inadmissible if he or she has engaged in a terrorist activity,
is a member of a terrorist organization, or endorses or espouses terrorist
3 65
activity or persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity.
"Terrorist activity" includes "seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill
or injure" another individual, and the use of any firearm or weapon."
"Engaged in terrorist activity" is defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) as
including, among other things, committing "an act that the actor knows, or
reasonably should know, affords materialsupport,including a safe houses,
transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material
financial benefits ...weapons . . . for the commission of a terrorist
3 67
activity.
While this bar to immigration or asylum has existed since 1990, the
adoption of the USA PATRIOT Act and REAL ID Act in 2005 broadened
section 212(a)(3)(B) "by expanding the definition of 'terrorist activity' and
'terrorist organization,' relaxing the bar's mens rea requirement, and
limiting the availability of a discretionary waiver. ,368 The USA PATRIOT
Act in 2001 expanded the definition of "engaged in terrorist activity" to
include "material support" to any organization engaged in "terrorist

364. Michael Kingsley Nyniah, Exclusion UnderArticleIF: Some Reflections on the Context,
PrinciplesandPractice, 12 INT'L J. REF. L. 295, 308 (2000).
365. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(2008); INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i).
366. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(2008); INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii). (emphasis added).
367. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv(2008)); INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv).
368. See Shaina Aber et al., UnintendedConsequences:Refugee Victims ofthe War on Terror,
37 Geo. J. Int'l L. 759,778 (2006). Compare,Immigration Act of 1990, PUB. L. No. 101-649, Stat.
4978 (1990), with INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2007). see also., Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]; The REAL ID Act of 2005
(contained in Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) [hereinafter REAL ID Act].

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

55

OF INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL Law,
Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Vol. 21, Iss. LAW
2 [2009], Art. 4

[Vol. 21

activity. ' 3 69 "Terrorist activity" was, in turn, expanded to include a range
of unlawful uses of a weapon other than for mere personal monetary
gain.37° Similarly in 2005, the REAL ID Act expanded the definition of
"non-designated" to include both groups and their sub-groups that use
weapons.37 ' As a result of both Acts, the types of material support that one
can provide are far-reaching. In fact, DHS has argued that material support
may include actions such as serving as a porter or even cooking.372 This
overly broad language in section 212(a)(3)(B) has prevented thousands of
refugees from obtaining asylum relief in the United States.373 With no

exclusions for children, the provision applies easily to child soldiers, even
those who simply served as cooks, night guards to militias, or government
armed forces.
Until 2006, the United States had no exception to the material support
bar. Rather, there was only a "waiver provision" which would permit the
government to grant resettlement to refugees who "provided material
support where... deemed necessary or desirable. 3 74 Under this provision,
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Secretary of State,
after consultation the Attorney General, had the discretion not to apply the
material support bar.375 All three executive departments needed to be in
agreement before the waiver could be granted. This provision was recently
deleted in the 2007 version of the INA and amended by the 2008
Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Appropriation Act, which recently became public law.37 6 Like the former
provision, the Appropriations Act states that the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Attorney
General, has the discretion not to apply section 212(a)(3)(B) to individual
369. See USA PATRIOT Act, § 801 (2001); see also Hearings,supranote 8, at 4 (describing,
in general, the details of the changes to § 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA as provided by the PATRIOT
Act).
370. See USA PATRIOT Act.
371. See REAL ID Act, supranote 368; Hearings,supra note 8, at 4.
372. See U.S. Campaign to Stop the Use ofChild Soldiers, supra note 260, at * 10 n.49 (citing
Abandoning the Persecuted: Victims of Terrorism and Oppression Barred from Asylum, Human
Rights First (2006)); see also Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2004).
373. See, Matter of R.K., 851 P.2d 62, 62 (Alaska 1993). In that case, a woman who was
abducted by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), gang-raped, and held
against her will was considered to have provided material support to the LURD rebels as she was
forced to perform tasks such as washing the rebels' clothing.
374. Aber et al., supra note 368, at 782.
375. Id.
376. H.R. 2764, S.1922 (110th Cong.) (2007). (enacted into public law Dec. 26, 2007). See
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007) [hereinafter
H.R.2764].
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aliens or particular groups who have engaged in terrorist activities.377
However, like the former provision, the new revision still remains "a heavy
burden and administratively difficult 3 78 as all three executive departments
need to be in agreement before the material support waiver is applied.
The new waiver provision may also be more restrictive than before as
it sets out significant caveats limiting the Secretaries' ability to apply the
discretionary waiver. As stated in the Appropriation Act, no waiver may
be extended to an asylum applicant who: (a) one of the executive
departments believes is engaged in terrorist activity; (b) is a member of or
has "voluntarily or knowingly" engaged in terrorist activity; or (c) has
engaged in a terrorist activity against the United States or that is directed
at civilians.3 79 The Act provides no guidance on how and to what extent the
waiver should be granted.
Only a year before the enactment of the 2008 Appropriations Act
however, DHS issued a memorandum providing detailed guidance to
asylum officers on granting a waiver to section 212(a)(3)(B) for designated
groups and individual asylum applicants on a case-by-case basis.380 If it
could be shown by a totality of the circumstances that an applicant
provided material support under duress, this bar to asylum would not
apply. An individual applicant must first establish prima facie eligibility
for asylum, and then undergo background and security checks to
demonstrate that he or she poses no danger to the United States.3 81 Once
this is determined, DHS must assess whether material support was given
under duress, whether the applicant could have avoided providing material
support; the severity and type of harm inflicted or threatened; to whom it
was directed, the perceived imminence of the harm threatened; and the
perceived likelihood that the harm would be inflicted.3 82 DHS must also
take into consideration when looking at the totality of the circumstances,
the type, amount and frequency of material support; "the nature of
activities committed by the terrorist organization[;] the [applicant's]...
awareness of those activities[;] the length of time since material support
was provided[; and] the applicant's conduct since that time. ' '383

377. Id. § 619.
378. Aber et al., supra note 368, at 783.
379. H.R. 2764, S.1922, § 619(110th Cong.)(2007).
380. See Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 26138 (May 8, 2007).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
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Given that the DHS duress waiver has only been in effect for a short
time, it is still unclear how and to what extent it will be - or has beenapplied to children, particularly child soldiers. It is even less unclear what
effect the new revision to the "waiver provision" as stated in the
Appropriations Act will have on child soldiers or DHS' discretionary
ability not to apply section 212(a)(3)(B). It could potentially trump the
DHS memo, requiring that the Department only extend the discretionary
waiver in the limited circumstances. If so, child soldiers stand to be
ineligible for the discretionary waiver in the Appropriations Act as much
of their conduct as soldiers was directed at civilians.
No matter what the affect of the Appropriations Act on DHS, the
duress waiver only remains available for asylum officers adjudicating
claims. In other words, it is not available in administrative or federal
courts, upon appeal. With no duress waiver available in court, judges are
then required to make a finding against credible and deserving applicants
like child soldiers.38
Whether adjudicated in court or before an asylum officer, the limited
availability of a duress waiver for section 212(a)(3)(B) runs afoul of the
U.S. obligations under several international treaties. The United States has
an obligation under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention not to expel or
return a refugee unless "there are reasonable grounds for regarding [the
refugee] as a danger to the security of the United States." and the refugee
"constitutes a danger to the [U.S.] community., 385 Applying the definition
of terrorist or applying the material support bar to children who were
forcibly conscripted as soldiers under duress is clearly inconsistent with
the "U.S. binding obligation under Article 33. " 386 Indeed, a child soldier
384. See McAllister v. Att'y Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2006), in concurring in the
denial of a former member of the Irish National Liberation Army, J. Barry wrote:
I concede. I cannot find a way to keep the McAllisters in this country, and I have surely
tried. But the laws Congress has enacted, particularly those enacted in the wake of the
September 11th horror, are bullet-proof, designed, as they should be, to combat
terrorism. The problem here, though, is that Congress's definition of"terrorist activity"
sweeps in not only the big guy, but also the little guy who poses no risk to anyone.
As of 2007, administrators within the Executive Officer of Immigration Review (EOIR) as well as
DHS were negotiating how the duress waiver could be applied in immigration court. For example,
ifan immigration judge determined that the key issue was duress in an asylum case, that case would
be adjourned and resubmitted to DHS for the duress waiver to be applied. To date, it is whether
negotiations have been resolved or continue to take place. Discussion with Professor David Martin,
University of Virginia School of Law (Dec. 18, 2007).
385. Aber et al., supra note 368, at 784-85.
386. Id. at 785.
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providing a single glass of water to an armed group does not make him or
her a danger to the security to the United States.387 Moreover, many former
child soldiers have overcome the psychological trauma of their past.
Programs run by the Red Cross or the International Refugee Committee
treat children to counteract the effects of the war.3"' These children thus
pose little threat to U.S. security as terrorist or supporters of terrorist
activities.
The United States has an obligation under international treaties to
ensure the protection of child soldiers and participate in their social
reintegration and psychological recovery. 389 Denying child soldiers the
protection of asylum directly contradicts the U.S. international obligations.
Indeed, under the Charming Betsy standard, an act of Congress "ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate
neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by
the law of nations as understood in this country., 39" This broad definition
of terrorist activity certainly violates the 1951 Convention where
undoubtedly, a more limited classification of "terrorist organization,"
"terrorist activity," and indeed "material support" would avoid barring
innocent civilians and children from war-torn countries from asylum.
A limited duress waiver for DHS and immigration courts runs afoul
of the intent of the PATRIOT Act and the REAL ID Act as well. Congress
intended the immigration law provisions of the PATRIOT Act and REAL
ID Act to bar from asylum or other relief "those who truly mean to provide
aid to actual terrorist organizations."'3 9' Indeed, the law was aimed to keep
out those who intended to cause harm to the United States while continuing
to give "hope and shelter to people who can legitimately claim and receive
asylum., 392 However, the literal language of this provision is so broad that
it encompasses the very people U.S. asylum law was intended to protectincluding children as victims of armed conflict.
A duress waiver is certainly a viable option under U.S. asylum laws.
Like the "past persecutor" bar, this material support provision requires
387. Id.
388. Perlmutter, supra note 5, at 146-47.
389. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, art. 6, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/54/263/Annex I (Feb. 12, 2002).
390. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
391. See Human Rights First, Abandoning the Persecuted: Victims of Terrorism and
OppressionBarredfromAsylum, 3-4 (2006) (citing statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, 151 CoNG.
REc.H550 (Feb. 10, 2005)); see also Hearings,supra note 8, at 4.
392. Hearings,supranote 8, at 4.
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courts to engage in a "line drawing problem" to determine whether a child
is inadmissible. Courts should thus undergo a particularized evaluation of
an asylum applicant's circumstances in order to determine whether an
individual's behavior renders them eligible for asylum.393 Incorporating a
duress waiver is the best way to do so.
The enactment of the Appropriations Act as well as the DHS memo
providing a duress waiver in certain circumstances demonstrates that the
United States has acknowledged the breadth of the material support
provision and its adverse affect on deserving asylum applicants. However,
given the extensive caveats of the Appropriations Act as well as the lack
of a duress waiver in court, the United States continues to drag its feet in
amending its asylum laws. Congress' tendency to err on the side of
enacting legislations for excessive national security - while a
commendable goal - has come at the sacrifice of child soldiers seeking and
deserving asylum. Indeed, an asylum system that takes into account duress
and coercion for even the most vulnerable applicants is still a long way
away.
D. Options Beyond Asylum
It is true that exclusion from refugee status does not entail
disqualification from all forms of protection under national and
international law. The excluded person may still avail him or herself to
other international instruments such as the Convention Against Torture
(CAT). Unlike asylum, there are no bars against eligibility under CAT.
Rather, it prohibits the deportation of any person when there are substantial
grounds for believing that the individual will be subject to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishing in the receiving state.394
However, the benefits are limited. While an individual cannot be returned
to their country of persecution, they can be removed to a third country if
one is available.39 Moreover, the individual may not adjust his or her
status to legal permanent resident status (LPR).396
The benefits of LPR status are substantial. They include the ability to
travel freely outside the United States, vote where jurisdictionally
permitted, petition for other family members to come to the United States,

393. LAUFER, supra note 352, at 457.
394. Covenant against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 3 U.N. Doc. A/Res/30/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
395. Id.
396. Midwest Immigrant & Human Rights Center, 15 (2005). Beneficiaries of CAT may still
obtain work authorization.
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naturalize and live permanently in the United States without fear of being
moved to another safe third country.3 97 To limit a child soldier's alternative
to asylum to CAT is not in their best interest. The United States has an
obligation under the Optional Protocol to reintegrate children in armed
conflict back into society.398 Such reintegration is dependent upon
obtaining residency status through asylum. CAT cannot provide such relief
as its limited benefits ultimately marginalize child soldiers as second class
citizens and continue to punish them for their past actions.39 9
V. RETHINKING ASYLUM LAW FOR CHILD SOLDIERS

The numerous obstacles that child soldiers potentially face in applying
for asylum demonstrate the serious need to reform the substantive criteria
of U.S. asylum laws. Special procedural rules for children help them to
gain access to the system; however, they still remain disadvantaged in the
asylum determination itself.4 .. By stopping short of substantively reshaping
the criteria for asylum, the 1998 Guidelines and the proposed UACPA
ignore children's best interest in determining their eligibility. As shown
above, child soldiers not only risk failing to establish prima facie eligibility
for asylum, they are also potentially barred either under the "past
persecutor" bar or the "material support" provision of the INA. With no
provision made to distinguish children from adults, in effect, children "are
simply not children" under asylum law.40 ' Rather, the equal treatment of
children and adults in asylum law undermines the U.S. obligation to
protect the children's needs - in direct contradiction to national and
international treaties to which the United States is a party.40 2
Child soldiers should be considered as deserving special status under
U.S. asylum law. On the one hand, they have committed serious atrocities
and have participated in the killing, maiming and raping of others. On the
other hand, they are victims to the very atrocities in which they were

397. See generallyUSCIS, Immigration Benefits, availableathttp://www.uscis.gov/greencard.
398. Optional Protocol, supra note 279, arts. 6, 7.
399. Providing limited benefits to children is not a problem unique to the U.S. Former child
soldiers in Germany expressed problems they face in lacking permanent residency status such as
being unable to travel with friend, obtain a drivers license, or being excluded from certain parts of
the education system and labor market. See Michaela Ludwig, Former Child Soldiers as Refugees
in Germany 24 (Rebecca Kmett, ed., Quaker United Nations Office), available at
http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/TdHQUNO.pdf
400. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 162.
401. Thronson, supra note 12, at 1002.
402. See supra Part Ill.
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involved. Ultimately, they are vulnerable and in need of care.4"3 In light of
their unique situation, child soldiers require a separate
substantive legal
4
standard that accounts for their status as children. N
A. A Callfor U.S. Acceptance of the Best Interest of the Child
Standardin the CRC
A critical first step in providing an asylum system that treats child
soldiers justly is the adoption of the best interest of the child standard at
stated in the CRC. Professor David Thronson has noted that in its current
state, the basic framework of immigration law "does virtually nothing" to
assure that children have the means to have their voices heard in their
proceedings.4 5 The best interest standard, he argues, incorporates a much
needed child-centered approach to immigration law.4 3' Indeed, DHS and
immigration courts make decisions everyday affecting the lives of
children. The best interest standard, Thronson explains, forces these
decision-makers to pay careful attention to the perspectives and needs of
the children before them. Thus, as the CRC requires, in every decision
affecting children, their voices must be heard and children's best interests
be made a primary consideration.4 7
Thronson's call for incorporating the "best interest" standard is
especially important for child soldiers. Without taking into account their
status and interests as children, child soldiers face a high risk of being
ineligible for asylum due to their past criminal actions. Undoubtedly, some
child soldiers have committed such extreme atrocities that bar them under
the basic framework of the law. Reforming U.S. asylum law to take into
account all children's best interests - even the most egregious claims from
child soldiers - would remind, indeed require asylum officers and
immigration judges alike that child soldiers are children first. As Thronson
notes, children in particularly vulnerable situations, like child soldiers,
"need [and] demand, our urgent attention. ' 4 8
One might question, however, why it is that the United States should
have to make such an overhaul of its asylum system on account of child
soldiers. As previously stated, of the 5,000 unaccompanied children
apprehended by the United States each year, only a fraction of those were
subjected to abuse as child soldiers. The actual number of child soldier
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Id.
Bien, supra note 126, at 826.
Thronson, supra note 12, at 1000.
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1015.
Id.
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asylum cases before asylum officers and immigrant judges is in fact
unknown. Moreover, the atrocities that some child soldiers have engaged
in cannot be ignored. One must seriously consider that some child soldiers
have not only participated in armed conflict, but also have experience in
the art of warfare and destruction. Others are addicted to cocaine or other
drugs and may have lost any sense of normalcy outside the context of war.
One might argue that while is one thing for the United States to engage in
efforts to stop the use of child soldiers abroad, it is quite another to open
U.S. borders to children who may pose security threats or who are
undoubtedly public charges. One might also question the benefits to
incorporating the best interest of the child standard to the merits of an
asylum case. The United States has already made efforts to provide them
with procedural protections; what is more, child soldiers' overall
experience in warfare may be no different than adults who are forcibly
conscripted. Indeed, adults also suffer from extreme physical, emotional
and psychological abuse while conscripted, and they are afforded no
advantages in asylum law. Child soldiers should therefore, like every other
individual, establish that they meet the statutory requirements for asylum.
In fact, one might further argue that the best interest standard has no place
in asylum law. Unlike other areas of U.S. law where the "best interest of
the child" standard is applied, asylum is a limited resource. While every
person has the right to apply for asylum, that does not mean that every
person has a right to asylum in and of itself.4"9 Given the fact that asylum
is a finite resource, one might argue that reforming the U.S. asylum system
to cater to the likes of child soldiers will open the doors to granting asylum
to other less worthy individuals.
What is more, not only will the "best interest of the child" standard
open the doors to unwanted individuals, one might also contend that
implementing such a standard would result in most, if not all, child solider
asylum applications being granted asylum. Indeed, in considering whether
to return a former child solider to a war-tom country or "resettle" him or
her in the United States, the "best interest of the child" standard would
essentially require immigration judges to grant child soldiers asylum.
Asylum would become mandatory rather than a discretionary decision for
judges adjudicating child soldiers' asylum claims.
Such arguments against a more child-sensitive asylum system for child
soldiers are extremely short-sighted in its view of the scope and purpose
of asylum in general. First, the small number of child soldiers entering the
409. See, e.g., David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the
Careful Use of a ScarceResource in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATEs, 30 (H.
Adelman ed. 1991) (noting that "there is no individual right of asylum in international law").
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United States does not undermine the seriousness and importance of the
United States affording special attention and care to the claims of
unaccompanied children like child soldiers. Just because the number of
child solider asylum seekers may be small does not mean that they cannot
put forth a credible claim to asylum. U.S. asylum law should at least be
flexible in its analysis of their claims to asylum in order to cater to these
vulnerable individuals.
Second, as discussed previously, the fact that some child soldiers have
engaged in human rights abuses themselves or have suffered extreme
psychological damage should not weaken or limit their access to asylum.
While some child soldiers have committed atrocities, those acts are part of
their own persecution. It cannot be ignored that in committing heinous
crimes such as killing or maiming civilians, they did so by force or under
the involuntary influence of drugs. Indeed, many child soldiers were forced
to act under a "killed or be killed" environment. As the victims of the very
acts they were forced to commit, child soldiers remain especially deserving
of refuge and protection.
What is more, that child soldiers arrive in the United States having
suffered extreme emotional and psychological abuse or no financial
resources by which to sustain themselves should have absolutely no
adverse influence on their asylum claims. There is no requirement that one
be free of emotional troubles or able to financially sustain oneself in order
to obtain asylum in the United States. Most asylees flee their countries and
seek refuge without monetary resources. As for child soldiers' emotional
and psychological abuse, it is this very abuse which gives them a credible
claim to asylum. The United States has in fact opened its doors to other
individuals who have suffered human rights abuses and undergone extreme
psychological and emotional trauma.41° Even before the 1998 Guidelines
to Child Asylum Claims, the United States recognized human rights
violations against women and the need for U.S. asylum law to "deal more
sensitively with substantive and procedural aspects of gender-related
claims.""41 That some child soldiers come to the United States having
killed others and suffering emotionally should not penalize them in seeking
asylum. They have been persecuted; thus, protection is warranted.

410. Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000) (petitioner found eligible for asylum
after being abused and beaten severely by her father because of his more religious Muslim beliefs);
Matterof Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989) (respondent suffered emotional trauma and physical
repercussions as a result of his father being a Christian minister in China during the Cultural
Revolution).
411. US. Guidelines on Gender-RelatedClaims, supra note 202, at *1.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss2/4

64

ASYLUMFighting
FOR CHILD
SOLDIERS
Everett: The Battle Continues:
for
a More Child-Sensitive Approac

Finally, implementing the "best interest of the child" principle into
U.S. asylum law would not result in every former child soldier being
granted asylum. As previously stated, this principle does not require that
states always undergo a course of action that is best for a child. Rather,
states must simply make the best interest of the child a primary
consideration in adjudicating child asylum claims. Indeed, in some
instances, granting asylum in the United States may not be in the best
interest of the child. Courts may take into account whether a child has
relatives in the United States or in his or her home country; whether the
home country is still in turmoil or is stable; and the availability of
reintegration programs for child soldiers abroad, among other
considerations. In light of these factors, an immigration judge may
ultimately determine that asylum is not in the best interest of the child.
Thus, implementing the "best interest of the child" standard is not in effect
a "free pass" for child soldiers into the United States. To the contrary, this
standard helps to incorporate a more child-sensitive approach to asylum
determinations in order to ensure a fairer outcome for child soldiers
seeking refuge.
Despite the current U.S. opposition to the CRC, ratifying CRC and
wholly adopting its "best interest of the child" principle is essential to
accounting for children's rights in asylum claims. Incorporating the best
interest of the child standard would not result in an uncontrollable influx
of child-asylees into the United States. Indeed, while there are over
300,000 child soldiers worldwide, statistics show that the United States
apprehended only 5,000 unaccompanied minors within the past year.4 2
Studies do not indicate how many of these unaccompanied minors were
child soldiers, but likely only a small amount were children exposed to
armed conflict. As enforcement concerns increasingly dominate the
political agenda, the United States "must ensure that the interests of
children - particularly child soldiers - are not marginalized. 41 3 By
restricting the "best interest of the child" standard to procedural questions,
the DHS and U.S. courts can do little to ensure that child soldiers are kept
from unsafe situations.414

412. See supra Part I; see also Women's Refugee Commission, UnaccompaniedImmigrant
Children & Family Detention, available at http://www.womensrefugeecomission.org/programs/
detentions/55-detentions/8 1-unaccompanied-alien-children-and-family-detention.
413. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 162.
414. Id. at 163.
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The United States has in fact, applied the best interest standard in
many other contexts such as family or criminal law.415 As Dalrymple notes,
there is little dispute over a state's authority to remove a child from a
dangerous setting. 6 Child soldiers also risk serious injury or death if they
are forced to return to their country of origin where they were persecuted.
They are in turn, similar to U.S. citizen children who risk harm if returned
to abusive parents. "Although the source of harm may differ, child soldiers
lack the safety and protection from their experience. '"417 Furthermore,
ratifying the CRC furthers U.S. humanitarian and foreign policy.418 Given
the increasing importance of international law and human rights norms to
the interpretation of asylum law, "any workable framework for children
rights must account for the idea of children's rights as human rights
represented by the Convention."' 9
Whether the United States ultimately ratifies the Convention, it should
nonetheless adhere to the best interest standard within the CRC. Indeed,
even when CRC has not been ratified by a State, the UNHCR encourages
2 Moreover,
its observance "[b]ecause its standards are universal.""4
although the United States has not yet ratified the CRC, it still remains a
signatory to the treaty.421 As such, the United States is obligated under
international law to avoid acts which would undermine the purpose of the
CRC, including its focus on the best interest of the child.422
The U.S. international commitment to the CRC should thus be
integrated into its national asylum laws and regulations. Indeed,
international human rights law and humanitarian law serve as a resource
for shaping refugee law and policy. 423 If the United States is truly serious
in its attempt to protect child soldiers from harm, then developing both
415. Id. at 146; see also, Nogosek, supra note 92, at 14 (noting that the areas of contract, tort,
and criminal law provide children with substantive protection from the harshness of the adult legal
standard).
416. Dalrymple, supranote 7, at 145.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 163 (citing Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of UnaccompaniedChildren into
the United States, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 137, 188-89 (1989)).
419. Thronson, supra note 12, at 988.
420. UNHCR Refugee Guidelines, supra note 80.
421. Bien, supranote 126, at 811 (citing the Vienna Convention of the Laws of Treaties, May
23, 1969).
422. Id.
423. See, e.g., UNHCR Summary Conclusions, supranote 289, at *1(noting that the Refugee
Convention, and in particular Article 1F should take an "evolutionary approach" and draw on other
developments in international law since 1951); Bhabha & Young, Through a Child's Eyes, supra
note 4, at 760 (stating that "any framework for the adjudication of children's asylum claims must
consider the provisions of international human rights instruments.").
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procedural and substantive protections based on the CRC's 'best interest
of the child' standard is essential.
B. Implementing the Best Interest Standardinto U.S. Asylum Law
U.S. immigration law is no stranger to the best interest standard. In
fact, as Thronson points out, the United States has promulgated its use in
the special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS) available to abused or
neglected children who have become dependents of the state.424 A hybrid
system of state and federal collaboration, SUS integrates the best interest
standard into immigration law by incorporating state child welfare
expertise into immigration matters and placing decision-making
responsibilities regarding child welfare "with those most qualified to make
them."425 SUS represents the best way for United States to consider the
best interest of children in asylum determinations. While the provision was
originally drafted to alleviate hardship for dependent alien juveniles by
giving an opportunity to apply for SIJS and LPR status, "this opportunity
for legal status should not be limited to this narrow category of
children.4 26 Child soldiers, among other children, are no less deserving of
protection.427
In order to be eligible for SIJ status, first the child must be present in
the United States. While children already living in the United States mostly
benefit from SIJS, it is also available to minors detained by the
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE). ICE has jurisdiction over
such minors until the Attorney General consents to state court
jurisdiction.428 Second, the child must be declared a dependent on the
juvenile court or the court must have legally committed the child to or
placed the child under the custody of a state department or agency.429 The
child must then be deemed eligible for long-term foster care, which
essentially "means that family reunification is not an option, and generally
the child will be expected to remain in foster care until reaching the age of

424. See Thronson, supranote 12, at 1004.
425. Id.
426. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 164.
427. Id.
428. See 8 U.S.C. § l10 1(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I).
429. See Thronson, supra note 12, at 1005-06; see also Immigrant Legal Resource Center,
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: For Children under Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 14 (2005)
available at refugees.org/data/nationalcenter/trainingmanuals/pdf/FINAL.JULY.11.
TRAINING.MANUAL.SAN.FRANCISCO.pdf [hereinafter ILRC].
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majority, unless the child is adopted or placed in a guardianship
situation. "430
A judge or administrative authority must determine that returning a
child to his previous home country is not in his best interest. 431' This
decision is reserved for the juvenile court only, which has the added
benefit of taking advantage of the courts' expertise in the area of child
welfare. Furthermore, DHS must rely upon the order of the juvenile court.
Thus, the Attorney General's role is limited to "consenting to the
dependency order serving a precondition to SIJ status. ' 32 SUS is not
subject to federal agency review.4 33 Indeed, the state court's order is a
substantial requirement for the immigration benefit.
Finally, the judge must make clear that the aforementioned findings
or determinations were made because of "abuse, neglect or
abandonment.1 34 However, this status should not be so narrowly tailored
to only apply to children as victims of abuse or neglect. Rather, it should
extend more broadly to all unaccompanied children, particularly child
soldiers, as they too are deserving of protection and care. Moreover, the
rationale behind the SIJS comports with the rationale for the INS 1998
Guidelines recognizing that children need special attention and care. It
seems only logical then to extend SUS-type proceedings to child-asylum
seekers.
The benefits of SIJ status are substantial. This status overall creates a
good balance between making considerations of best interest of the child
and "the need for more meaningful control over immigration by leaving
decisions of admissibility with DHS.4 35 Indeed, juvenile court is the best
place for best interest standard to be applied. All fifty states have created
administrative and judicial system to protect the health, safety and welfare

430. ILRC, supra note 429, at *14.
431. The applicant must be a person "for whom it has been determined that in the
administrative or judicial proceeding that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned
to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii)(2008).
432. Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian and Alien? The Contradictions of Protecting
UndocumentedChildren under the Special ImmigrantJuvenile Statute, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
597, 609 (2000).
433. See 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 42847 ("decision concerning the best interest of the child may
only be made by the juvenile court or in an administrative proceedings [sic] ...[t]he Service
believes that it would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Service to routinely readjudicate
judicial or social service agency administrative determinations as to the juvenile's best interest.").
434. ILRC, supra note 429, at *14.
435. Chen, supra note 432, at 611.
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of children.436 This structure effectively removes DHS from best interest
of the child determinations - "a task it could not effectively person because
4 37
of its conflicting interest in restricting immigration into the U.S."
Reliance upon juvenile court to adjudicate SUS "represents a significant
first step toward a more child centered approach to thinking about children
in [asylum].' ' 438
The United States should consider implementing the best interest of
the asylum seeker in the same way that it determines eligibility for SUS.
That is, the basis for granting asylum status would be determined by child
welfare experts who have the knowledge and experience to better serve
children. Their status as unaccompanied children renders them eligible for
long-term foster care as dependents on the state. Moreover, child soldiers
would be deemed eligible for long-term foster care not only because of the
abuse they have suffered, but also on the basis of persecution as victims of
armed conflict. With a finding that it is not in a former child soldier's best
interest to return to their home country, the child would be granted asylum
status in the same fashion as he or she would SIJ status.
DHS would still have the ability to revoke status "at any point before
the applicant completes the final processing for adjustment of status" to
LPR.439 That is, a child may be rendered ineligible on deportability or
inadmissibility grounds. Congress however, has enacted a number of
protections to ensure that the inadmissibility and deportability grounds are
not haphazardly applied to children. Specifically, in 1993, Congress added
create waivers for SIJS applicants from standard bars of inadmissibility
under INA §212(a)." DHS therefore, has the ability to waive some
inadmissibility -grounds such as public charge, lack of necessary
documentation, and most importantly, acts of terrorism and the material
support provision for "humanitarian purposes, family unity, or when it is
otherwise in the public interest."" The Immigrant Legal Research Center
notes that it is probable, although not guaranteed, that a waiver for one of
the aforementioned grounds will be approved." 2 If it is, child soldiers who
found themselves subjected to the material support bar could avoid this
overreaching provision. Indeed, as victims ofpersecution themselves, child

436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

Id. at 610.
Id.at 612.
Thronson, supra note 12, at 1008.
ILRC, supra note 429, at *34.
See 8 U.S.C. 1182 § 1255(h); INA § 245(H)(2).
See INA §§ 212(a)(4), (a)(7)(A), (a)(3)(A),(B),(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h); INA § 245(H)(2).
ILRC, supra note 429, at *29.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

69

INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF
Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Law,
Vol. 21, Iss.LAW
2 [2009], Art. 4

[Vol. 21

soldiers aptly fit within the waiver for humanitarian purpose, if not for
public interest.
SUS thus "serves as a model for reform of the United States asylum
law ...by using the best interests principle as the main criteria instead of
requiring that the child's harm fall within the scope of the five enumerated
grounds." 43 In effect, applying SIJS to child asylum seekers "remedies the
difficulty of applying the traditional refugee definition to unaccompanied
children" like child soldiers.
SIS however, is not perfect in form or in practice. Since its
implementation, DHS continues to retain control over the ultimate
immigration decision by requiring that the Attorney General "expressly
consent to the dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of'
SUS." 5 Moreover, the government enacted a jurisdictional consent
provision which provides that when a child is in "actual or constructive
custody" of the Attorney General, "no juvenile court has jurisdiction to
determine.., custody status or placement of an alien unless the Attorney
General specifically consent to such jurisdiction." 6 Since juvenile courts
have the expertise in implementing what is in the best interest of the child,
assumingly denial of consent to transfer jurisdiction would be rare. "In
practice, however, such cases have been denied." 7 As a result, minors like
child soldiers, remain in INS detention or are returned to their country of
origin without an opportunity to apply for SIJS." These denials have been
attributed to DHS reluctance to share responsibility in adjudicating
immigration proceedings." 9
In order to make SJS work effectively, particularly as a way to
adjudicate child asylum claims, the decisions regarding the welfare of
children should be removed from DHS altogether. The SUS statute itself
expressly directs DHS to rely on a court's findings of the minor's best
interests.45 As Chen points out, unlike asylum law or the Violence Against
Women Act, SU status does not require asylum officers to make
independent findings of a child's abuse.45 ' Rather, "the receipt of

443. Dalrymple, supra note 7, at 167 (citing Thronson, supra note 12, at 1015 ("reforms to
safeguard the best interests principle in the SIJS laws are not sufficient; the best interests principle
should be applied to a wider population of unaccompanied children.")).
444. Id. at 167.
445. Thronson, supranote 12, at 1007.
446. Id.
447. ILRC, supra note 429, at *16.
448. Chen, supranote 432, at 613.
449. Id. at 614.
450. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(27)(J)(i).
451. Chen, supranote 432, at 608.
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substantive immigration benefit" is conditioned upon a state order.452 Thus,
DHS has little to no place determining the welfare of children.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, state courts are better equipped
to determine child welfare issues. With resources, experience and expertise
available, states and local governments have long since established the
competency to handle complex child welfare issues. The federal
government, on the other hand, has limited operational capacity to address
children's welfare needs in addition to making asylum determinations.45
This is not to suggest that DHS is inept or completely unable to determine
child welfare matters.
Arguably, DHS asylum officers could be trained to deal with
especially sensitive issues relating to children. Nevertheless, by doing so,
DHS would not only lag far behind in its expertise and experience in child
welfare matters, the government still has conflicting interests in
"restricting immigration into the United States."454 As Chen notes, the
federal government plays the role of the "gatekeeper" - enforcing
immigration law, protecting U.S. borders and removing individuals
without lawful immigration status.455 Therefore, it cannot in its adversarial
role determine child asylum claims while simultaneously making decisions
regarding the child's best interest. Given its inability to be a neutral party,
decisions regarding the welfare of child do not belong in the hands of
DHS.
Ultimately, there needs to be a relaxation of the Attorney General's
consent requirement to allow those with expertise in child welfare to make
independent decisions. Alternatively, Thronson suggests passing the
UACPA and creating an Office of Children's Services within the
Department of Justice. 56 Either of these proposals would remove
children's welfare decisions from DHS and begin the systematic process
of taking into account the best interest of the child.
VI. CONCLUSION

Creating a more child-sensitive approach to U.S. asylum law - one
that incorporates the CRC's best interest of the child standard into the
procedural and substantive asylum analysis - is long overdue. More than

452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

Id.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 613.
Thronson, supra note 12, at 1014.
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ten years have passed since the promulgation of the 1998 Guidelines for
Child-Asylum Claims. While the Guidelines represented the U.S.
willingness to address the serious issues that unaccompanied children like
child soldiers face when seeking asylum, these children still risk being
ineligible and excluded from asylum in light of their past actions in armed
conflict. It is time to seriously reexamine the Guidelines and U.S. asylum
law as applied to children such as child soldiers.
To be clear, this Article is not endorsing the idea that all former child
soldiers who seek refuge in the United States, should be granted asylum.
Indeed, while all children as individuals have the right to apply for asylum,
this Article concedes that asylum itself is not a right. Nevertheless, to deny
a child soldier asylum without taking into primary consideration his or her
best interests ultimately undermines the U.S. obligation to provide
protection such children from harm.
The United States has a legal and moral obligation to ensure that its
refugee and asylum laws "keep pace" with international concerns
regarding human right violations against children. The violence and abuse
faced by child soldiers continues to stand at the forefront of international
and national concern. While child soldiers are afforded protection in
international human rights and humanitarian law, the battle continues for
child soldiers to gain similar protection under U.S. asylum law. An
improved, more child-sensitive approach to asylum law based on the best
interest of the child standard is long overdue.
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